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Abstract. This article focuses on the technique of postponing the application of the
reduction ad absurdum rule (raa) in classical natural deduction. First, it is shown how this
technique is connected with two normalization strategies for classical logic: one given by
Prawitz, and the other by Seldin. Secondly, a variant of Seldin’s strategy for the postpone-
ment of raa is proposed, and the similarities with Prawitz’s approach are investigated. In
particular, it is shown that, as for Prawitz, it is possible to use this variant of Seldin’s strat-
egy in order to induce a negative translation from classical to intuitionistic and minimal
logic, which is nothing but a variant of Kuroda’s translation. Through this translation,
Glivenko’s theorem for intuitionistic and minimal logic is proven.
Keywords: Proof theory, natural deduction, double-negation translation, Glivenko’s theo-
rem
1. Introduction
Among the inference rules of classical natural deduction, the reductio ad
absurdum – denoted by raa – formalizes the principle of a “proof by con-
tradiction”: if a contradiction is obtained from ¬A, then A can asserted
and the hypothesis ¬A can be dropped, i.e. discharged. This principle is
rejected by intuitionism and, in general, by constructive accounts of logic.
More precisely, raa is not an admissible inference rule in intuitionistic natu-
ral deduction, even if the latter contains a special case of raa, called ex falso
quodlibet and denoted by efq. This rule formalizes the “principle of explo-
sion”: from a contradiction anything can be asserted, without discharging
any hypothesis. The rule efq, in turn, is not admissible in a more restrictive
system of constructive logic, like minimal natural deduction.
For natural deduction of first-order classical logic (with the raa rule) there
are two general strategies for defining a weak normalization procedure: one
due to Prawitz and one due to Seldin (see [16, pp. 282–283] for a first com-
parison).
Prawitz’s idea [17] is to restrict to the fragment {¬,∧,→,⊥,∀}, reduce all
the applications of raa to atomic formulas, and then apply whatever normal-
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ization strategy for intuitionistic logic one likes (see [17, pp. 39–41]). Seldin’s
idea [20], on the other hand, is to restrict to the fragment {¬,∧,∨,→,⊥,∃},
reduce all the applications of raa present in a derivation tree to at most one
single application occurring as the last step of the tree (this is the postpone-
ment of raa), and then apply whatever normalization strategy for intuitionis-
tic logic one likes (see [20, pp. 638–645]).1 Prawitz’s and Seldin’s strategies
can be seen as “dual”: the former breaks down classical reasoning into a num-
ber of atomic steps of raa, the latter compactifies classical reasoning into one
single (possibly complex) step of raa, the final one. Moreover, a peculiarity
of Seldin’s strategy is that Glivenko’s theorem (for intuitionistic logic) can
be obtained as an immediate consequence: it is sufficient to drop the raa rule
of a normal (according to Seldin) derivation in classical logic, and replace it
with a ¬-introduction rule discharging the same assumptions (see [20, §3]).
Glivenko’s theorem, in its original formulation [10], states that if a for-
mula is provable in classical propositional logic then its double negation is
provable in intuitionistic propositional logic (the converse trivially holds).
Thus, it allows propositional classical logic to be embedded into propositional
intuitionistic logic. Several refinements and generalizations of Glivenko’s the-
orem are well-known (see [6] for a partial survey): there are extensions of
the result to first-order [11, 20, 6], second-order [32] and substructural logics
[9, 14, 7], and there is an embedding of classical logic into minimal logic [5].
All these results are obtained using different approaches, both syntactic and
semantic.
Starting from a comparison of Prawitz’s and Seldin’s weak normalization
strategies, we will modify Seldin’s reduction steps for the postponement of
raa in order to achieve two goals: on the one hand, we induce two variants
of Kuroda’s negative translation [12, 8, 3] of first-order classical logic into
intuitionistic and minimal logic; on the other hand, we give an elegant proof
of Glivenko’s theorem for both intuitionistic and minimal logic. We obtain
these results through a completely proof-theoretic approach. The three main
reasons for the interest of this approach are:
1. We point out that the postponement of raa not only is an interesting result
in itself, with remarkable consequences such as weak normalization and
Glivenko theorems (as first observed by Seldin [20]), but it allows them
to be proved in a uniform way in, at least, a triple sense:
1Both Prawitz and Seldin consider that a normal derivation is a derivation in which
there are no detours. However, the notion of detour specific to classical logic is not the
same for them. We will analyze this point in detail in §2.
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(a) we prove the postponement of raa and its consequences for first-order
classical logic, but our methods and techniques can also be applied in
other systems, such as second-order classical logic (see point 2 below),
and the modal logics S4 and S5 with quantifiers;
(b) the postponement of raa allows derivation of Glivenko’s theorem for
both intuitionistic and minimal logic using the same proof-theoretic
approach based on our reduction steps; and
(c) the reduction steps we have defined are essentially variants of the ones
used by Seldin, Prawitz and others (see §2) to prove weak normaliza-
tion for classical natural deduction.
2. Our proof of the postponement of raa is proof-theoretic in a “geometric”
way, in the sense that it relies on a notion of size for a derivation based
only on the distance of the instances of raa from the conclusion of the
derivation; the complexity of formulas play no role in this definition of
size. This approach has two immediate consequences:
(a) it allows us to generalize the postponement of raa and its corollaries
to second-order classical logic, since the substitution of formulas for
propositional variables does not impact the size we have defined;
(b) we prove the postponement of raa in a weak form, in the sense that if
we apply our reduction steps to suitable instances of raa, then the size
of the derivation decreases; but we strongly conjecture that, by refin-
ing this notion of size, our reduction steps allow the postponement
of raa in a strong sense, i.e. they can be applied following whatever
strategy one likes.
3. Besides the atomization of raa proposed by Prawitz’s weak normalization
strategy for classical natural deduction, which is deeply related to the
Gödel–Gentzen negative translation, we show that the postponement of
raa induces (a variant of) Kuroda’s negative translation.
Outline The article will be structured into two parts. In the first part,
namely §2, we will present a survey of the relevant literature concerning the
(weak) normalization strategies for classical natural deduction. The second
part presents our technical contributions. More precisely, §3 is devoted to
basic definitions for first-order language and natural deduction. In §4 we will
introduce our reduction steps, and in §5 we will use them to prove the post-
ponement of raa. Finally, in §6, we will expose the relationship with Kuroda’s
translation, and the Glivenko theorems for intuitionistic and minimal logic.
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2. Normalization of classical logic: an overview
Looking closer at the distinction between Prawitz’s and Seldin’s weak nor-
malization strategies, we note that actually this distinction is not as sharp
as it might appear at a first glance. In particular, each of these strategies
can be exploited to eliminate classical detours by postponing the use of raa.
Let us clarify this point.
2.1. Prawitz’s (weak) normalization strategy: its legacy (1965-
2012)
As already mentioned, Prawitz’s original weak normalization strategy for
classical natural deduction [17] was conceived only for the fragment {¬,∧,→
,⊥,∀}, which is adequate for the full first-order language L of classical logic.2
One of the challenges that arose from Prawitz’s work was to find a weak
normalization strategy for the full language L. Specifically, the idea was to
prove this result by somehow relaxing Prawitz’s strategy: instead of proving
the atomization of all the raa occurrences present in a given derivation, it is
sufficient to eliminate all classical detours, where a classical detour is defined
as an instance of the raa rule that introduces a formula occurrence A and
is immediately followed by an instance of an elimination rule having A as
major premiss. In this paper, such detours will be called classical detours
à la Prawitz, since they correspond to the definition of maximum formula
given by Prawitz in [17, p. 34].
In order to better appreciate this departure from Prawitz’s original strat-
egy, we give an example. Prawitz observes that the following derivation
contains a complex instance of raa
p¬(A ∧B)q1
.... pi
⊥
raa1
A ∧B
.... pi0
(1)
and so needs to be reduced to a derivation with less complex instances of raa,
i.e.
2In Prawitz [17], as well as in the other approaches that will be analyzed in this section,
negation ¬ is not treated as a primitive operator, but is defined by ¬A := A → ⊥, and
its introduction and elimination rules are special cases of the introduction and elimination
rules for implication. As we will see in §3, our approach is different.
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p¬Aq2
pA ∧Bq1
∧e1
A
¬e
⊥
¬1i
¬(A ∧B)
.... pi
⊥
raa2
A
p¬Bq4
pA ∧Bq3
∧e2
B
¬e
⊥
¬3i
¬(A ∧B)
.... pi
⊥
raa4
B
∧i
A ∧B
.... pi0
(2)
But is it necessary to reduce all complex instances of raa (i.e. the in-
stances of raa whose conclusions are non-atomic formulas)? Maybe it would
be enough to focus only on a particular subset of them: the ones forming
classical detours à la Prawitz. The reason is that only in this situation we are
creating a rules’ configuration which is similar to the standard (intuitionistic)
detours of the form ◦-introduction/◦-elimination (for a certain connective ◦):
the rule raa plays the role of an introduction rule. Thus, instead of (1), we
could consider
p¬(A ∧B)q1
.... pi
⊥
raa1
A ∧B
∧e1
A
.... pi0
(3)
and reduce it to
p¬Aq2
pA ∧Bq1
∧e1
A
¬e
⊥
¬1i
¬(A ∧B)
.... pi
⊥
raa2
A
.... pi0
(4)
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It is worth noticing that (4) is nothing but a subderivation of (2). How-
ever, adopting this second kind of reduction does not mean that we are simply
applying a special case of Prawitz’s original strategy. There is indeed a cru-
cial difference between the two reductions presented here. In the reduced
derivation (2), the distance from the conclusion of the two instances of raa is
one unit greater than the distance from the conclusion of the instance of raa
which is present in the original derivation (1). In contrast, in the reduced
derivation (4), the distance from the conclusion of the instance of raa is one
unit smaller that the distance from the conclusion of the instance of raa in
the original derivation (3). In other words, where Prawitz’s original strat-
egy (1)-(2) brings the application of raa forward, the second strategy (3)-(4)
postpones the application of raa.
2.1.1. Statman’s approach (1974)
As far as we know, the first to take into consideration this postponing strategy
for solving the normalization problem of classical natural deduction for the
full first-order language was Statman [23]. He considered, in particular, the
following general reduction scheme for classical detours à la Prawitz:
p¬Aq1
.... pi
⊥
raa1
A
..... pi
′
◦e
C
.... pi0
reduces to
p¬Cq2
pAq1
..... pi
′
◦e
C
¬e
⊥
¬1
i¬A
.... pi
⊥
raa2
C
.... pi0
(5)
where ◦e is an elimination rule for any connective ◦ of the full language of first-
order logic (see [23, pp. 78–79]) and A is the major premiss of ◦e.
3 This means
that, unlike Prawitz, Statman does not have to drop disjunction and the
existential quantifier in order to apply his reduction steps. However, instead
of reasoning in a pure combinatorial way on the application of the reduction
steps – as previously done by Prawitz – Statman adopts a different approach,
3The fact that, in the derivation Π on the left-hand side of (5), A is the major premiss
of ◦e ensures that ◦e does not discharge any assumptions of the subderivation pi, hence all
assumptions in the derivation on the right-hand side of (5) are already assumptions of Π .
See also §2.2 below.
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which basically consists of two phases. First, second-order predicate classical
logic is considered and embedded into a system of second-order intuitionistic
propositional logic by using a homomorphism which preserves the reduction
relations. Secondly, a (strong) normalization theorem for this intuitionistic
system is proved. To prove this theorem, impredicative methods are used.
Besides the use of impredicative methods, there is another problem which
could make Statman’s approach not completely satisfactory: the ∨- and ∃-
elimination rules can only be applied in the restricted case in which their
conclusion is ⊥ (see [23, p. 90]), i.e.
A ∨B
pAq1
...
⊥
pBq1
...
⊥
∨′
1
e
⊥
and
∃xA
pAq1
...
⊥
∃′
1
e
⊥
Statman’s solution seems then to lack of generality and uniformity.
Some arguments can be invoked to justify Statman’s choice to work with
these restricted versions of the ∨- and ∃-elimination rules. For simplicity, let
us restrict to the case of disjunction. First, it should be noted that, within
the framework of classical logic, the usual ∨-elimination rule – i.e. ∨e – and
the restricted version used by Statman – i.e. ∨′e – are equivalent from the
point of view of derivability. Indeed, ∨′e is just a special case of ∨e, and
conversely, ∨e is classically derivable from ∨
′
e:
A ∨B
p¬Cq2
pAq1
...
C
¬e
⊥
p¬Cq2
pBq1
...
C
¬e
⊥
∨′e
1
⊥
raa2
C
The restriction imposed on the ∨-elimination rule can also be explained
by a second argument. In his proof of (strong) normalization for classical nat-
ural deduction, Statman passes through an intermediate step: he shows that
the set of classical derivations can be embedded into the subset of classical
derivations not containing ∨ and ∃, and that this embedding preserves the
reduction relations between derivations. This means that, unlike Prawitz,
Statman does not start by replacing the full first-order language with the
fragment {¬,∧,→,⊥,∀} (which is still adequate for classical logic). In other
words, Statman is not reasoning at the level of the derivability relation be-
tween sentences, but at the level of the reduction relations between deriva-
tions. Thus, strictly speaking, he maintains the full language of classical logic
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and uses an operation m0 – corresponding to Gentzen’s negative translation
– just to narrow down the set of derivations which have to be analyzed with
respect to the reduction relations.
In such a context, disjunction can be defined in terms of negation and
conjunction, so that m0(A ∨ B) := ¬(¬m0(A) ∧ ¬m0(B)).
4 And if we have
two derivations of the form
m0(A)
...
⊥
and
m0(B)
...
⊥
we could obtain ¬m0(A)∧¬m0(B) (namely, by dischargingm0(A) andm0(B)
through ¬-introduction rules, and applying then a ∧-introduction), so that in
presence of ¬(¬m0(A)∧¬m0(B)) – which, as we said, is equal to m0(A∨B)
– we can conclude ⊥. This shows that the rule
m0(A ∨B)
pm0(A)q
1
...
⊥
pm0(B)q
1
...
⊥
S1
⊥
is derivable. And this is nothing but a way to say that working with a
restricted version of the ∨-elimination rule – where ⊥ is the conclusion –
does not represent a real limitation if one works modulo m0: the rule S and
the rule ∨′ share the same inferential structure. In other words, the operation
m0 is an homomorphism which preserves the inferential structure.
2.1.2. Stålmarck’s approach (1991)
Being conceived for second-order logic, Statman’s approach rests on an im-
predicative analysis of derivations and of their reduction relations. An alter-
native approach to the (weak) normalization of classical natural deduction
for the full first-order language using only pure combinatorial means was
proposed by Stålmarck [22].
Like Statman, Stålmarck’s fundamental idea consists of removing the
maximum formulas which appear in classical detours à la Prawitz by push-
ing raa downwards with respect to the elimination rules for the connectives
4Note that Statman composes then the operation m0 with another operation m1 –
corresponding to the so-called Russell–Prawitz translation [17, p. 67] – in order to further
narrow down his analysis to the set of derivations and reductions which use only implication
and the second-order universal quantifier (see [23, p. 91–92]).
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of the full first-order language. But, unlike Statman, Stålmarck has no re-
strictions on ∨- and ∃-elimination rules.5 The problem for Stålmarck is that,
by using the reduction scheme (5), when ◦ is a disjunction or an existen-
tial quantifier, the formula C introduced by raa in the reduced derivation
could be more complex than the formula A introduced by raa in the original
derivation. Thus, a priori there is nothing which tells him when to stop the
reduction of the classical detours. In particular, in order to prove the weak
normalization of classical natural deduction for the full first-order language,
Stålmarck cannot proceed like Prawitz in two phases, that is, first, by atom-
izing all the occurrences of raa, and secondly, by applying any normalization
strategy for intuitionistic logic. On the contrary, Stålmarck has to treat
classical and intuitionistic detours on a par, and he has to eliminate them
together by (a main) induction on the complexity of the maximum formulas
of the detours.
The problem is that this method could conflict with certain applications
of the reduction scheme (5). Consider the case of conjunction. In (4), the
formula ¬(A ∧ B) introduced by a ¬i rule could be the major premiss of a
¬e rule; it could thus create a new detour with a maximum formula more
complex than the original one (namely A ∧ B, associated with the classical
detour). Indeed, in this case the derivation (4) has the form
p¬Aq2
pA ∧Bq1
∧e1
A
¬e
⊥
¬1i
¬(A ∧B)
.... pi1
A ∧B
¬e
⊥
.... pi2
⊥
raa2
A
....
pi0
and, according to the reduction scheme (5), the derivation we have before
the application of the reduction step is the following, where the maximum
formula of the classical detour is A ∧B:
5Like Statman, Stålmarck’s main interest is a strong normalization theorem for classical
logic. Since we mainly focuses on the problem of the downward postponement of raa, it is
sufficient to consider here only Stålmarck’s weak normalization strategy [22, pp. 133–135].
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p¬(A ∧B)q1
....
pi1
A ∧B
¬e
⊥
.... pi2
⊥
raa1
A ∧B
∧e1
A
.... pi0
(6)
Stålmarck’s solution consists in adding to (5) a new reduction scheme
which transforms (6) into
p¬Aq1
p¬Aq1
....
pi1
A ∧B
∧e1
A
¬e
⊥
....
pi2
⊥
efq
A ∧B
∧e1
A
¬e
⊥
raa1
A
.... pi0
In this way, the occurrence of raa is not only pushed downward, but also
applied to a formula of lower complexity than the original one, respecting
in this sense Prawitz’s original idea. However, unlike Prawitz’s atomization
procedure, in order to define this reduction, a step of efq has to be added.
This represents an important point on which we will return later (see §2.2).
The other difference to Prawitz’s procedure is that, by considering the
full first-order language, Stålmarck also has to define reduction steps for
classical detours à la Prawitz created by a raa immediately followed by a ∨-
or ∃-elimination rule. Let us focus on the ∨ case.
As we have seen for conjunction, if we follow the reduction scheme (5) to
define a postponement of raa with respect to ∨e, we would have that
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p¬(A ∨B)q1
.... pi
⊥
raa1
A ∨B
pAq2
..... pi
′
C
pBq2
..... pi
′′
C
∨2e
C
.... pi0
reduces to
p¬Cq3
pA ∨Bq2
pAq1
..... pi
′
C
pBq1
..... pi
′′
C
∨1e
C
¬e
⊥
¬2
i
¬(A ∨B)
.... pi
⊥
raa3
C
.... pi0
(7)
and thus, when in the subderivation pi the assumption ¬(A ∨ B) is the ma-
jor premiss of a ¬e, we could create a new detour ¬i/¬e, having ¬(A ∨ B)
as maximum formula, which is more complex than the maximum formula
eliminated by the reduction step itself, namely A ∨ B. However, when we
are dealing with disjunction, the solution proposed by Stålmarck for conjunc-
tion is no longer sufficient to circumvent this problem. More precisely, the
derivation
p¬(A ∨B)q1
.... pi1
A ∨B
¬e
⊥
.... pi2
⊥
raa1
A ∨B
pAq2
..... pi
′
C
pBq2
..... pi
′′
C
∨2e
C
.... pi0
would reduce to
p¬Cq2
.... pi1
A ∨B
pAq1
..... pi
′
C
pBq1
..... pi
′′
C
∨1e
C
¬e
⊥
.... pi2
⊥
raa2
C
.... pi0
(8)
but since C could be any compound formula, it could create a new classical
detour (when C in pi0 is the major premiss of an elimination rule) more
complex than the one just eliminated.6
6Note also that in this reduction for ∨e, differently from the ∧ case, the appeal to the
efq rule would be pointless. If efq was used after the ⊥ of the pi derivation in order to
obtain A∨B, then another step of ∨e would be needed. This would force one to conclude
C, and thus to use ¬e again—with ¬C as major premiss— followed by the pi derivation.
Hence, the result would be nothing but a repeated duplication of the original reduction
pattern.
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In order to solve this problem, Stålmarck decomposes the reduction for
the ∨ case into two steps. First, he starts with a sort of expansion of the
∨e rules present in a given derivation, where ⊥ plays the role of a minimum
formula in the two threads starting from the assumptions A and B, respec-
tively, and the end-formula C (when C 6= ⊥) is introduced by raa,7 i.e. the
derivation
p¬(A ∨B)q1
.... pi1
A ∨B
¬e
⊥
.... pi2
⊥
raa1
A ∨B
pAq2
..... pi
′
C
pBq2
..... pi
′′
C
∨2e
C
.... pi0
reduces to
p¬(A ∨B)q1
.... pi1
A ∨B
¬e
⊥
.... pi2
⊥
raa1
A ∨ B
p¬Cq3
pAq2
..... pi
′
C
¬e
⊥
p¬Cq3
pBq2
..... pi
′′
C
¬e
⊥
∨2e
⊥
raa3
C
.... pi0
Second, the original reduction procedure is applied, following the com-
plexity of the maximum formulas of the detours (namely, starting with C).
This is possible since the reduction of a ∨ classical detour is now operated
only when the conclusion of the ∨e is ⊥, so no new more complex detours
are created.8 When it comes the turn of the ∨ classical detour, we have that
p¬(A ∨B)q1
.... pi1
A ∨B
¬e
⊥
.... pi2
⊥
raa1
A ∨B
pAq2
..... pi
′
⊥
pBq2
..... pi
′′
⊥
∨2e1⊥
.... pi0
reduces to
.... pi1
A ∨B
pAq1
..... pi
′
⊥
pBq1
..... pi
′′
⊥
∨1e1⊥
.... pi2
⊥
efq
A ∨B
pAq2
..... pi
′
⊥
pBq2
..... pi
′′
⊥
∧2e1⊥
.... pi0
(9)
Note that Stålmarck’s first step for the reduction of the ∨ case can also
be described as the application of a permutative conversion between the ∨e
7We use here the term ‘thread’ in the sense of Prawitz [17, p. 25] (see also Definition 1,
infra). For the definition of expansion and minimum formula see Prawitz ([18, part II.3]).
8The reason is that the burden of the creation of new (possibly) more complex detours
rests now on the preliminary step corresponding to the “expansion” of the ∨e rule described
above.
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and the ¬e rules in the reduced derivation of (8), as remarked by de Groote
([4, p. 184]).9 It is for this reason that we can say that Stålmarck works with
the standard set of inference rules for classical logic. More precisely, unlike
Statman—who works with a system of classical logic where the rule ∨e is
replaced by the rule ∨′e—Stålmarck keeps defining the system of classical
rules using the standard ∨e. In particular, since the permutative conversions
are taken into account when a ∨e is involved in a classical detours, this rule is
used in a restricted way only with respect to the reduction procedure for clas-
sical detours, but not with respect to the simple construction of a derivation.
What is lost, then, is the uniformity of the reduction procedure for classical
detours, even if there is no loss from the point of view of derivability.
2.1.3. von Plato and Siders’ approach (2012)
A uniform solution to the weak normalization problem of classical natural
deduction for the full first-order language— i.e. a solution imposing no sort
of restriction to the application of the inference rules of the full first-order
classical natural deduction—was finally given by von Plato and Siders [31].10
They consider the same notion of classical detour à la Prawitz as Stål-
marck, but they use a system of natural deduction for classical logic where
all the elimination rules are presented in a general form as done in [26]. For
example, the elimination rules for conjunction and implication become re-
spectively
A ∧B
pA,Bq1
.... pi
C
∧1e
C
and
A→ B A
pBq1
.... pi
C
→1e
C
Using these general elimination rules, von Plato and Siders are able to
define the postponement of raa (for classical detours à la Prawitz) in an
uniform way, following the general reduction scheme (5).
In this way, unlike Stålmarck’s reductions, no use of efq is needed. More-
over, Stålmarck’s treatment of ∨e through a permutative conversion with a
¬e can be extended to all the other elimination rules, thanks to their gen-
eral form. Besides, unlike Stålmarck, the appeal to permutative conversions
does not represent a necessary step, since there is no need for reasoning over
9See also [22, p. 136]. The definition of permutative conversions (or reductions) is given
in [17, p. 51] and [18, p. 253].
10In [31], von Plato and Siders propose only a weak normalization theory for classical
logic. A strong normalization strategy is suggested in [28].
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the complexity of the maximum formulas of classical detours. The reason is
that, by using general elimination rules, a derivation in classical logic can be
considered to be normal when all major premisses of the elimination rules
are assumptions. In order to obtain this normal form, it is sufficient to apply,
first, the reductions associated to the classical detours – as described in (5) –
and then the reductions associated to the intuitionistic detours. In this way
Prawitz’s original strategy is respected, even if the reductions of classical de-
tours are not necessarily associated with the atomization of the applications
of raa rules. Thus, as in Prawitz (see [17, p. 41] and [18, part. II.3.2]), a
classical proof in normal form becomes a derivation essentially composed of
two parts:11
[. . . ] from the endformula upward, there will be a sequence of I-rules and
their nested premisses [. . . ] until a conclusion of a rule DN [i.e. raa] is
reached. Its premiss is ⊥. Looking from the other direction, from top
formulas downward, we find a nested sequence of major premisses of E-rules.
[. . . ] the presence of rule DN can force conclusions of E-rules in normal
derivations to be equal to the premiss ⊥, without any a priori requirement
that this should be so. ([31, p. 208])
Therefore, in a normal derivation the application of the raa rule is what
separates one of the parts containing the elimination rules from the part
containing the introduction rules. Schematically, this takes the form:
11Note that, by restricting to the fragment {¬,∧,→,⊥,∀}, Prawitz’s notion of classical
normal derivation can be defined with respect to the notion of branch (see [17, p. 52]). On
the other hand, working with the full language and using general elimination rules obliges
Siders and von Plato to define the notion of classical normal derivation with respect to
another notion, that of thread (see [31, p. 208]). The reader has to pay attention that von
Plato and Siders’ definition of thread is different from Prawitz’s one (already mentioned
here at p. 12). More precisely, von Plato and Siders’ notion of thread is conceived as a
sort of generalization of Prawitz’s notion of path, allowing one to go through a derivation
by jumping from the major premiss of a general elimination rule to the assumptions of the
minor premisses of the same rule. For more detail see Negri and von Plato ([29, p. 196 et
sqq.] and [30, p. 26–27]).
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p¬A1q
1
.... pi1
A1
¬e
⊥
.... E-rules
⊥
raa1
A1
. . .
p¬Anq
n
.... pin
An
¬e
⊥
.... E-rules
⊥
raan
An
. .
.
I-rules
...
C
This makes clear that in order to obtain the normal form for classical nat-
ural deduction (with respect to classical detours à la Prawitz), it is sufficient
to push raa downwards with respect to the elimination rules whose major
premiss is the conclusion of raa, while nothing is said about the possibility of
pushing raa downwards with respect to introduction rules, or to elimination
rules whose major premiss is not a conclusion of raa. Nevertheless, in [31,
p. 210], von Plato and Siders also mention the possibility of defining the
reduction steps for pushing raa downwards with respect to the introduction
rules of the propositional fragment. These reduction steps are then explicitly
given by von Plato in [27, pp. 86–87].
2.2. Seldin’s normalization strategy (1986)
Turning now to Seldin’s approach [20] for the weak normalization of first-
order classical natural deduction, we can see that the principal difference
to Prawitz rests on the notion of classical detour which is adopted. Seldin
considers that a classical detour consists in a raa rule introducing a formula
occurrence A, which is immediately followed by another rule having A as one
of its premisses (see [20, p. 638]).
This characterization is more general than Prawitz’s: in order to eliminate
a classical detour, raa must be pushed downwards not only with respect to
the major premiss of the elimination rules, but also with respect to any
(introduction or elimination) inference rule immediately below raa.
It would be tempting, for such a purpose, to appeal to the reduction
scheme (5) and to generalize it in order to define a reduction procedure
for Seldin’s notion of classical detour. The idea would be to replace the
elimination rule ◦e in (5) by some rule s. More precisely, given a derivation
with an instance r of raa which is not its last rule, a reduction step  either
pushes r downwards or erases r, i.e. if s is an instance of a (1-, 2- or 3-ary)
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rule immediately below r, one has (for C 6= ⊥):
p¬Aq1
.... pi
⊥
raa1
A
..... pi
′
s
C
.... pi0
 
p¬Cq2
pAq1
..... pi
′
s
C
¬e
⊥
¬1
i¬A
.... pi
⊥
raa2
C
.... pi0
and
p¬Aq1
.... pi
⊥
raa1
A
..... pi
′
s
⊥
....
pi0
 
pAq1
..... pi
′
s
⊥
¬1
i¬A
.... pi
⊥
.... pi0
However, as already noticed by Seldin [20, pp. 642, 645], these schemata
work only if no assumption of pi is discharged at s in the derivations on the
left-hand side of ; otherwise the transformation  would change the set of
non-discharged assumptions, adding new formulas in it (think for example
of the case in which s is a →i rule, or a ∃e rule with A as its minor premiss).
Seldin’s solution consists in adopting two alternative schemata (C 6= ⊥):
p¬Aq1
.... pi
⊥
raa1
A
..... pi
′
s
C
.... pi0
 
p¬Cq2
p¬Cq2
pAq1
..... pi
′
s
C
¬e
⊥
¬1i
¬A
.... pi
⊥
efq
A
..... pi
′
s
C
¬e
⊥
raa2
C
.... pi0
(10)
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p¬Aq1
.... pi
⊥
raa1
A
..... pi
′
s
⊥
.... pi0
 
pAq1
..... pi
′
s
⊥
¬1i
¬A
.... pi
⊥
efq
A
..... pi
′
s
⊥
.... pi0
(11)
Note that these reductions make use of a efq rule. We have already seen
the same occurring in Stålmarck’s reductions for the {¬,∧,→,⊥,∀} fragment.
In fact, Stålmarck’s reductions are just a particular case of Seldin’s ones, as
they only work when s is an elimination rule with A as major premiss.
It should also be noted that, in Seldin’s case, no restrictions have to be
made on the applications of ∨e and ∃e rules during the process of normaliza-
tion. The reason is that his normalization strategy is not like Stålmarck’s
one, but follows the same pattern as Prawitz. First, all classical detours
are eliminated, and secondly, all intuitionistic detours are eliminated. The
difference to Prawitz is the way in which classical detours are eliminated.
In Seldin, the elimination of classical detour consists in pushing down all
instances of raa with respect to all the other rules, and then contract these
instances of raa into one. In this way, what tells him when the elimination of
classical detours has to stop is the position of raa in the derivation tree, and
not, like in Prawitz, the complexity of the formula to which raa is applied. By
borrowing a terminology from Girard’s jargon, we could say that for Seldin
the termination of classical detours elimination can be characterized in a
geometrical way rather than in a syntactical one.12
However, even Seldin’s strategy is not immune from some restrictions in
order to work. The ∀ has to be dropped (i.e. Seldin’s approach works for
the {¬,∧,∨,→,⊥,∃} fragment, which is as expressive as the full language
of first-order classical logic), since the reduction schemata (10)-(11) cannot
be applied when s is a ∀i rule. Indeed, the natural way to treat the ∀i case
would be the following reduction step:
12Note that also von Plato and Siders’ normalization strategy can be characterized in
geometric rather than in syntactic terms: in order to establish when a proof is in normal
form it is sufficient to look at the position of the major premisses of the elimination rules
– namely, the fact of being in the position of assumptions – and not at their syntactical
form.
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Π =
p¬Aq1
..... pi
′
⊥
raa1
A
∀i
∀xA
.... pi
 
p¬∀xAq2
pAq1
∀i
∀xA
¬e
⊥
¬1
i¬A
..... pi
′
⊥
raa2
∀xA
.... pi
= Π ′
but Π ′ is not a derivation in classical natural deduction (nor in its subsys-
tems) because in Π ′ the rule ∀i is not correctly instantiated: indeed the
variable x may occur free in A and A is a non-discharged assumption when
the rule ∀i is applied in Π
′. There is no (reasonable) way to treat the ∀i case
without adding any rule of some intermediate logic such as MH, see [20, in
particular pp. 639-640].
Nevertheless, as already anticipated in the introduction, the problem con-
cerning ∀ is a small limitation with respect to the great advantage of Seldin’s
strategy, consisting in obtaining Glivenko’s theorem for intuitionistic logic as
an immediate corollary (see [20, pp. 637-638])13: in a derivation where raa is
postponed (possibly it contains several instances of efq that are not its last
rule), it is sufficient to replace its last rule – a raa rule – by a ¬-introduction
rule discharging the same assumptions.
2.3. Towards a unified approach
In this article we will focus on the postponement of raa: we aim to show that
Seldin’s result about the postponement of raa can be generalized in such a
way that a Glivenko’s theorem can be obtained not only for intuitionistic but
also for minimal logic. In order to do this, we will proceed in two steps.
First, we will show that, with respect to Seldin’s definition of classical
detour, the use of the efq rule in the reduction steps can be limited to just the
case where s corresponds to the →i rule. However, the reduction steps that
we define for classical detours will not come out from a uniform reduction
scheme – as in Seldin’s original formulation – but they will come out from
a mixing of techniques. More precisely, we can divide the definition of our
reduction steps according to two main cases (see §4):
13Note that the same result can be obtained using the reduction rules proposed by von
Plato, that we mentioned at the end of §2.1.3 (see [27, pp. 87–88; pp. 142–143]).
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1. when the maximum formula A is obtained from a raa followed by an
elimination rule s,
(a) if A is the major premiss of s, we will follow the general scheme (5);
(b) if A is one of the minor premisses of s, we will introduce new specific
reduction steps.
2. when the maximum formula A is obtained from a raa followed by an
introduction rule, we will follow (with some emendations for the case of
the implication) the reduction steps proposed by von Plato ([27, p. 85–86];
cf. also the end of §2.1.3, supra).
As it will become clear in §5 (see also Definition 1), our main concern is
the “geometrical” character of the postponement of raa, while normalization
of classical logic is only an indirect target. In this sense, we will see that
it is not necessary to take into consideration the complexity of the formulas
introduced by the raa rule. This will lead us to consider also other kinds of
reduction steps involving instances of rules in which more than one of their
premisses is obtained from raa. Multiple occurrences of raa then need to be
considered – and reduced – at the same time, even if they create maximum
formulas of greater complexity. Nevertheless, even by working with this new
kind of reduction step, we can eventually show that a (weak) normalization
theorem for classical logic can be recovered.
Secondly, we will show how the reductions that we propose can shed light
on a problem raised by Pereira [15] and determine the exact relations between
normalization strategies for classical logic and negative translations. It is
not difficult to see that Prawitz’s original normalization strategy [17, pp.39-
40] for the fragment {¬,∧,→,⊥,∀} of classical natural deduction induces a
negative translation: it is sufficient to replace every atomic instance of raa
present in a normal classical proof with a ¬i in order to obtain a variant (·)
g
of Gentzen’s translation, such that
(P (t1, . . . , tn))
g = ¬¬P (t1, . . . , tn) (⊥)
g = ⊥
(A ∧B)g = Ag ∧Bg (A→ B)g = A→ Bg
(¬A)g = ¬Ag (∀xA)g = ∀xAg
and where ∨ and ∃ are already translated, since they are defined via a
combinations of the primitive connectives, i.e. A ∨ B := ¬(¬A ∧ ¬B) and
∃xA := ¬∀x¬A. Note also that since Ag is minimally equivalent to ¬¬Ag,
then A → Bg is minimally equivalent to A → ¬¬Bg; but A → ¬¬Bg is
also minimally equivalent to ¬(A ∧Bg). Hence, just by using minimal logic
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steps this variant of Gentzen’s negative translation can be transformed into
a variant of Gödel’s negative translation (cf. [15, p. 22]).14
In a similar way, we will show that Seldin’s normalization strategy in-
duces another kind of negative translation, namely (a variant of) Kuroda’s
one. However, a crucial difference exists between the Gödel–Gentzen transla-
tion and Kuroda’s original translation: the former can embed classical logic
into minimal logic, while the latter cannot (see [8]). The parallel between
Prawitz’s and Seldin’s strategies would then work only partially. Actually,
we will show that this is too harsh a conclusion. Indeed, by a slight modifi-
cation of Kuroda’s translation induced by our reduction steps, we obtain an
embedding of full first-order classical logic into the fragment {¬,∧,∨,⊥,∃}
of minimal logic. In particular, the (adequate) fragment {¬,∧,∨,⊥,∃} of
first-order classical logic (where → and ∀ are defined using the other connec-
tives) is embedded into minimal logic via this variant of Kuroda’s translation
simply by adding a double negation in front of formulas: we get in this way
a Glivenko theorem for minimal logic.
In fact, in [21, pp. 203,216], Seldin already proved a form of Glivenko’s
theorem consisting of embedding the system TD∗ into minimal logic. But
TD
∗ is a weaker system than first-order classical logic, since it corresponds
to first-order minimal logic plus the rule of consequentia mirabilis
p¬Aq1
.... pi
A
cm1
A
and in this system neither raa nor efq are derivable (see [2] for details). Our
result is thus more general.
It is worth noting that, unlike the algebraic demonstration given in [5],
our demonstration makes use of purely proof-theoretic tools and is not re-
stricted to the propositional fragment. But this does not mean that our
result is the only proof-theoretic demonstration of Glivenko’s theorem for
first-order minimal logic. A proof-theoretic demonstration of this theorem
is also given by Tennant [24]. However, unlike our approach, he does not
appeal to the postponement of raa for classical logic, but he translates each
classical inference rule into a corresponding derivable rule in the fragment
{¬,∧,∨,⊥,∃} of minimal logic. In this way, by induction on the length of a
14Even when the full language fragment is considered, like in Stålmarck’s [22] or in von
Plato and Siders’ [31] approaches, it is possible to detect the use of some kind of negative
translations. See Appendix A.1 for more details.
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derivation, he can then transform a classical derivation into a derivation in
minimal logic (for more details see Appendix A.2).
3. The syntax of first-order natural deduction
Let us first recall (quite informally) the language of first-order logic that we
will use for our presentation.
Formulas are generated by the propositional connectives ⊤ (truth), ⊥
(falsehood), ¬ (negation), ∧ (conjunction), ∨ (disjunction), → (implication),
and the quantifiers ∀ (universal) and ∃ (existential), starting from an infinite
set of individual variables (denoted by x, y, z, etc.) and, for any n ∈ N, a
set of n-ary function symbols (which for our purposes here we do not need
to denote apart from the terms in which they occur) and a set of n-ary
predicate symbols (denoted by P,Q,R, etc.).15 Terms are denoted by s, t,
etc.; formulas are denoted by A,B,C, etc., in particular atomic formulas
different from ⊥,⊤ are denoted by P (t1, . . . , tn) where P is a n-ary predicate
symbol (n ∈ N). Sets of formulas are denoted by Γ,∆, etc.
Formulas are identified up to renaming of bound variables. The capture-
avoiding substitution of a term t for all the free occurrences of an individual
variable x in a formula A is denoted by A{t/x}: it is implicitly assumed that
none of the individual variables occurring in t are bound in A (this condition
can always be fulfilled by renaming the bound variables of A).
A derivation system in first-order natural deduction is the set of deriva-
tions that can be obtained from a given set of inference rules. In other words,
a derivation system is identified with the set of its inference rules. The com-
plete list of inference rules that we will consider for any derivation system in
first-order natural deduction is in Figure 1. Given two derivation systems D
and D′, D is a subsystem of D′ if D ⊆ D′; hence, any derivation in D is also
a derivation in D′. The notions of derivation, conclusion and (major, minor)
premisses of an instance of rule are taken for granted (see for example [17]).
Looking at the inference rules in Figure 1, observe that efq is nothing but
the special case of raa where no assumption is discharged. This means that,
in a derivation pi, every instance of the rule efq is just an instance of the rule
raa discharging no assumption. We can thus say that, in a derivation pi, an
instance of raa is discharging if it is not an instance of efq (i.e. it discharges
at least one assumption).
15In particular, for n = 0, we get a set of individual constants and a set of proposition
symbols: therefore, we will consider propositional natural deduction as a subsystem of
first-order natural deduction.
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...
⊥
efq
A
p¬Aq∗
...
⊥
raa∗
A
⊤i
⊤
pAq∗
...
⊥
¬∗i¬A
...
¬A
...
A
¬e
⊥
pAq∗
...
B
→∗
iA→ B
...
A→ B
...
A
→e
B
...
A
...
B
∧i
A ∧B
...
A ∧B
∧e1
A
...
A ∧B
∧e2
B
...
A
∨i1A ∨ B
...
B
∨i2A ∨B
...
A ∨ B
pAq∗
...
C
pBq∗
...
C
∨∗e
C
...
A
∀i
∀xA
...
∀xA
∀e
A{t/x}
...
A{t/x}
∃i
∃xA
...
∃xA
pAq∗
.... pi
C
∃∗e
C
Every formula occurrence in a derivation pi that is not the conclusion of some rule instance
in pi is an assumption of pi: it may be discharged or undischarged (in pi). A discharged
assumption A of a derivation pi is denoted by pAq with a marker – here noted with a
placeholder ∗ for a numeral – for indicating the instance of rule in pi that has discharged
it. The rules that can discharge assumptions are raa, →i, ∨e and ∃e: any instance of these
rules may discharge an arbitrary number of assumptions; possibly none. In the rule ∀i, the
variable x must not be free in the undischarged assumptions. In the rule ∃e, the variable
x must not be free in C or the non-discharged assumptions of pi different from A.
Figure 1. Inference rules for first-order natural deduction (i stands for intro, e for elim).
Note that negation ¬ is here considered as primitive:16 ¬A will not be
treated as a shorthand for A → ⊥, and the inferences rules ¬i and ¬e (see
Figure 1) will be not special cases of →i and →e, respectively. The reason is
that, for our purposes (see in particular §6), it turns out that the rules →i
and ¬i have different behavior.
17
16This is also what is done by Andou [1] in his proof of (weak) normalization for classical
logic (cf. [1, p. 152]). Taking ¬ as primitive is essential for him in order to define what
he calls a regular proof, that is, a proof in which all the discharged assumptions of raa
are major premisses of a ¬e [1, p. 154]. We have not analyzed Andou’s proposal in §2
since we should have considered not only the detour reductions, but also other kinds of
transformations necessary for putting non-normal proofs in the regular form.
17Taking ¬ as primitive is just a matter of convenience: all our results can be proved
in a setting where ¬A := A → ⊥ and the rules ¬i and ¬e are special cases of →i and →e.
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We say that the first-order minimal natural deduction is the derivation
system NM = {⊤i,¬i,¬e,∧i,∧e1 ,∧e2 ,∨i1 ,∨i2,∨e,→i,→e,∀i,∀e,∃i,∃e} (i.e. in
NM there are all the inference rules in Figure 1 except raa and efq); the
first-order intuitionistic natural deduction is the derivation system NJ =
NM ∪ {efq}; and the first-order classical natural deduction is the derivation
system NK = NM ∪ {raa}. This means that NM is a subsystem of NJ, and
that NM and NJ are both subsystems of NK. All the derivation systems we
will consider are subsystems of NK.
Notation. Let D ⊆ NK be a derivation system.
(i) Derivations in D are denoted by Π,Π ′, . . . , or also pi, pi′, . . . .
(ii) Given a derivation pi in D, let RAApi (resp. RAA
+
pi ) denote the set of
instances (resp. discharging instances) of the rule raa in pi.
(iii) Given a formula B, a set of formulas Γ , and a derivation pi in D, we write
pi : Γ ⊢D B (or simply pi : Γ ⊢ B when no ambiguity arises) to indicate
that the conclusion of pi is B and the undischarged assumptions of pi are
occurrences of some formulas in Γ ; possibly, not all formulas in Γ occur
as undischarged assumptions in pi.
(iv) If there is a derivation pi : Γ ⊢D B, we write Γ ⊢D B and say that B is
derivable from Γ (or Γ ⊢ B is derivable) in D; otherwise we write Γ 6⊢D B.
Clearly, RAA+pi ⊆ RAApi for every derivation pi in D ⊆ NK.
Given an instance r of a rule in a derivation pi, it is natural to define the
notion of distance of r in pi as the number of instances of rules in pi between
r and the last rule of pi. More formally, we have that:
Definition 1 (Thread; distance of a rule; RAA-size of a proof; standard
derivation). Let pi be a derivation in D ⊆ NK.
Given two formula occurrences A and B in pi, a thread from A to B in
pi is a sequence t = (Ai)0≤i≤n (with n ∈ N) of formula occurrences in pi such
that A0 = A, An = B and, for any 0 ≤ i < n there is an instance of rule in
pi having Ai as a premise and Ai+1 as its conclusion; the length of t is n.
18
For every instance r of a rule in pi, the distance of r ( from the conclusion
of pi), denoted by distpi(r), is the length of the thread from the conclusion of
r to the conclusion of pi.19
However, this requires us to distinguish, for all formulas A→ B, whether B equals ⊥.
18Note that if A = B (as formula occurrences in pi) then the length of t is 0.
19This notion is well-defined since a derivation is a tree (i.e. a rooted acyclic connected
graph) whose nodes are formula occurrences. Hence, for every formula occurrence A in pi,
there exists exactly one thread from A to the conclusion of pi.
24 Guerrieri and Naibo
An r ∈ RAApi is RAApi-maximal if distpi(r) ≥ distpi(r
′) for any r′ ∈ RAApi.
An r ∈ RAA+pi is RAA
+
pi -maximal if distpi(r) ≥ distpi(r
′) for any r′ ∈ RAA+pi .
The RAA-size of pi is sizeRAA(pi) =
∑
r∈RAApi
distpi(r).
The RAA+-size of pi is sizeRAA+(pi) =
∑
r∈RAA+pi
distpi(r).
We say that pi is m-standard if in pi there is at most one instance of the
rule raa, and this instance, if any, is the last rule of pi, the rest of pi being a
derivation in NM.
We say that pi is j-standard if in pi there is at most one discharging
instance of the rule raa, and this instance, if any, is the last rule of pi, the
rest of pi being a derivation in NJ.
The notion of m-standard (resp. j-standard) derivations characterizes ex-
actly the derivations in NK where the raa (resp. discharging raa) is postponed.
These notions will be used in Theorem 8 and Corollary 9. A j-standard deriva-
tion might contains several instances of efq, which are not its last rule.
Note that, for any derivation pi and any instance r of a rule in pi, one has
that distpi(r) ∈ N and sizeRAA(pi) ≥ sizeRAA+(pi) ∈ N. Moreover, distpi(r) = 0
if and only if r is the last rule in pi.
Since we are mainly interested in the postponement of raa instead of
normalization, differently from the approaches discussed in §2, our definitions
of RAApi-maximal and RAA
+
pi -maximal in a derivation pi depend only on the
distances of the instances of raa from the conclusion of pi, without taking
into account the complexity of the formulas occurring in the conclusions of
these instances. In a way, as we will see in §5, our approach to prove the
postponement of raa is purely “geometrical”.
Remark 2. Let pi be a derivation in D ⊆ NK:
1. sizeRAA+(pi) = 0 if and only if pi is j-standard;
2. sizeRAA(pi) = 0 if and only if pi is m-standard.
Intuitively, in a derivation pi in D ⊆ NK, an instance (resp. a discharging
instance) r of the rule raa is RAApi-maximal (resp. RAA
+
pi -maximal) when
there are no other instances (resp. discharging instances) of raa above r.
Since a derivation pi in D ⊆ NK can be seen as a finite tree, if RAApi 6= ∅
(resp. RAA+pi 6= ∅), i.e. if there is at least one instance (resp. discharging
instance) of the rule raa in pi, then there is a RAApi-maximal (resp. RAA
+
pi -
maximal discharging) instance of the rule raa in pi.
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4. Reduction steps for the postponement of raa
We define reduction steps case by case, depending on the inference rule in-
stantiated immediately below the instance of raa under focus (thus there is
no case with a 0-ary inference rule).
¬ introduction:
Π =
pAq2, p¬⊥q1
..... pi
′
⊥
raa1
⊥
¬2i
¬A
.... pi
 
pAq2,
p⊥q1
¬1i
¬⊥
..... pi
′
⊥
¬2i
¬A
.... pi
= Π ′ (12)
¬ elimination:
Π =
p¬¬Aq1
..... pi
′
⊥
raa1
¬A
..... pi
′′
A
¬e
⊥
.... pi
 
p¬Aq1
..... pi
′′
A
¬e
⊥
¬1i
¬¬A
..... pi
′
⊥
.... pi
= Π ′ (13a)
where the last rule of the derivation pi′′ is not an instance of the rule raa;
Π =
..... pi
′
¬A
p¬Aq1
..... pi
′′
⊥
raa1
A
¬e
⊥
.... pi
 
..... pi
′
¬A
..... pi
′′
⊥
.... pi
= Π ′ (13b)
where the last rule of the derivation pi′ is not an instance of the rule raa;
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Π =
p¬¬Aq1
..... pi
′
⊥
raa1
¬A
p¬Aq2
..... pi
′′
⊥
raa2
A
¬e
⊥
.... pi
 
p¬Aq2 pAq1
¬e
⊥
¬1i
¬A
..... pi
′′
⊥
¬2i
¬¬A
..... pi
′
⊥
.... pi
= Π ′ (13c)
∧ introduction:
Π =
p¬Aq1
..... pi
′
⊥
raa1
A
..... pi
′′
B
∧i
A ∧B
.... pi
 
p¬(A ∧B)q2
pAq1
..... pi
′′
B
∧i
A ∧B
¬e
⊥
¬1i
¬A
..... pi
′
⊥
raa2
A ∧B
.... pi
= Π ′
(14a)
where the last rule of the derivation pi′′ is not an instance of the rule raa;
Π =
..... pi
′
A
p¬Bq1
..... pi
′′
⊥
raa1
B
∧i
A ∧B
.... pi
 
p¬(A ∧B)q2
..... pi
′
A pBq1
∧i
A ∧B
¬e
⊥
¬1i
¬B
..... pi
′′
⊥
raa2
A ∧B
.... pi
= Π ′
(14b)
where the last rule of the derivation pi′ is not an instance of the rule raa;
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Π =
p¬Aq1
..... pi
′
⊥
raa1
A
p¬Bq2
..... pi
′′
⊥
raa2
B
∧i
A ∧B
.... pi
 
p¬(A ∧B)q3
pAq2 pBq1
∧i
A ∧B
¬e
⊥
¬1i
¬B
..... pi
′′
⊥
¬2i
¬A
..... pi
′
⊥
raa3
A ∧B
.... pi
= Π ′
(14c)
∧ elimination:
Π =
p¬(A ∧B)q1
..... pi
′
⊥
raa1
A ∧B
∧e1
A
.... pi
 
p¬Aq2
pA ∧Bq1
∧e1
A
¬e
⊥
¬1i
¬(A ∧B)
..... pi
′
⊥
raa2
A
.... pi
= Π ′ (15a)
Π =
p¬(A ∧B)q1
..... pi
′
⊥
raa1
A ∧B
∧e2
B
.... pi
 
p¬Bq2
pA ∧Bq1
∧e2
B
¬e
⊥
¬1i
¬(A ∧B)
..... pi
′
⊥
raa2
B
.... pi
= Π ′ (15b)
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∨ introduction:
Π =
p¬Aq1
..... pi
′
⊥
raa1
A
∨i1
A ∨B
.... pi
 
p¬(A ∨B)q2
pAq1
∨i1
A ∨B
¬e
⊥
¬1i
¬A
..... pi
′
⊥
raa2
A ∨B
.... pi
= Π ′ (16a)
Π =
p¬Bq1
..... pi
′
⊥
raa1
B
∨i2
A ∨B
.... pi
 
p¬(A ∨B)q2
pBq1
∨i2
A ∨B
¬e
⊥
¬1i
¬B
..... pi
′
⊥
raa2
A ∨B
.... pi
= Π ′ (16b)
∨ elimination:
Π =
p¬(A ∨B)q1
..... pi
′
⊥
raa1
A ∨B
pAq2
..... pi
′′
C
pBq2
..... pi
′′′
C
∨2e
C
.... pi
 
pA ∨Bq2
p¬Cq3
pAq1
..... pi
′′
C
¬e
⊥
p¬Cq3
pBq1
..... pi
′′′
C
¬e
⊥
∨1e
⊥
¬2i
¬(A ∨B)
..... pi
′
⊥
raa3
C
.... pi
= Π ′
(17a)
where the last rule of the derivations pi′′ and pi′′′ is not an instance of raa;
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Π =
..... pi
′
A ∨B
pAq2, p¬Cq1
..... pi
′′
⊥
raa1
C
pBq2
..... pi
′′′
C
∨2e
C
.... pi
 
..... pi
′
A ∨B
pAq1, p¬Cq2
..... pi
′′
⊥
p¬Cq2
pBq1
..... pi
′′′
C
¬e
⊥
∨1e
⊥
raa2
C
.... pi
= Π ′
(17b)
where the last rule of the derivations pi′ and pi′′′ is not an instance of raa;
Π =
..... pi
′
A ∨B
pAq2
..... pi
′′
C
pBq2, p¬Cq1
..... pi
′′′
⊥
raa1
C
∨2e
C
.... pi
 
..... pi
′
A ∨B
p¬Cq2
pAq1
..... pi
′′
C
¬e
⊥
pBq1, p¬Cq2
..... pi
′′′
⊥
∨1e
⊥
raa2
C
.... pi
= Π ′
(17c)
where the last rule of the derivations pi′ and pi′′ is not an instance of raa;
Π =
..... pi
′
A ∨B
pAq3, p¬Cq1
..... pi
′′
⊥
raa1
C
pBq3, p¬Cq2
..... pi
′′′
⊥
raa2
C
∨3e
C
.... pi
 
..... pi
′
A ∨B
pAq1, p¬Cq2
..... pi
′′
⊥
pBq1, p¬Cq2
..... pi
′′′
⊥
∨1e
⊥
raa2
C
.... pi
= Π ′
(17d)
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where the last rule of the derivation pi′ is not an instance of the rule raa;
Π =
p¬(A ∨B)q1
..... pi
′
⊥
raa1
A ∨B
pAq3, p¬Cq2
..... pi
′′
⊥
raa2
C
pBq3
..... pi
′′′
C
∨3e
C
.... pi
 
pA ∨Bq2
pAq1, p¬Cq3
..... pi
′′
⊥
p¬Cq3
pBq1
..... pi
′′′
C
¬e
⊥
∨1e
⊥
¬2i
¬(A ∨B)
..... pi
′
⊥
raa3
C
.... pi
= Π ′
(17e)
where the last rule of the derivation pi′′′ is not an instance of the rule raa;
Π =
p¬(A ∨B)q1
..... pi
′
⊥
raa1
A ∨B
pAq3
..... pi
′′
C
pBq3, p¬Cq2
..... pi
′′′
⊥
raa2
C
∨3e
C
.... pi
 
pA ∨Bq2
p¬Cq3
pAq1
..... pi
′′
C
¬e
⊥
pBq1, p¬Cq3
..... pi
′′′
⊥
∨1e
⊥
¬2
i
¬(A ∨B)
..... pi
′
⊥
raa3
C
.... pi
= Π ′
(17f)
where the last rule of the derivation pi′′ is not an instance of the rule raa;
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Π =
p¬(A ∨B)q1
..... pi
′
⊥
raa1
A ∨B
pAq4, p¬Cq2
..... pi
′′
⊥
raa2
C
pBq4, p¬Cq3
..... pi
′′′
⊥
raa3
C
∨4e
C
.... pi
 
pA ∨Bq2
pAq1, p¬Cq3
..... pi
′′
⊥
pBq1, p¬Cq3
..... pi
′′′
⊥
∨1e
⊥
¬2
i
¬(A ∨B)
..... pi
′
⊥
raa3
C
.... pi
= Π ′
(17g)
→ introduction:
Π =
pAq2, p¬Bq1
..... pi
′
⊥
raa1
B
→2i
A→ B
.... pi
 
p¬(A→ B)q3
pAq2,
p¬(A→ B)q3
pBq1
→0i
A→ B
¬e
⊥
¬1i
¬B
..... pi
′
⊥
efq
B
→2i
A→ B
¬e
⊥
raa3
A→ B
.... pi
= Π ′
(18)
→ elimination:
Π =
p¬(A→ B)q1
..... pi
′
⊥
raa1
A→ B
..... pi
′′
A
→e
B
.... pi
 
p¬Bq2
pA→ Bq1
..... pi
′′
A
→e
B
¬e
⊥
¬1i
¬(A→ B)
..... pi
′
⊥
raa2
B
.... pi
= Π ′ (19a)
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where the last rule of the derivation pi′′ is not an instance of the rule raa;
Π =
..... pi
′
A→ B
p¬Aq1
..... pi
′′
⊥
raa1
A
→e
B
.... pi
 
p¬Bq2
..... pi
′
A→ B pAq1
→e
B
¬e
⊥
¬1i
¬A
..... pi
′′
⊥
raa2
B
.... pi
= Π ′
(19b)
where the last rule of the derivation pi′ is not an instance of the rule raa;
Π =
p¬(A→ B)q1
..... pi
′
⊥
raa1
A→ B
p¬Aq2
..... pi
′′
⊥
raa2
A
→e
B
.... pi
 
p¬Bq3
pA→ Bq2 pAq1
→e
B
¬e
⊥
¬1i
¬A
..... pi
′′
⊥
¬2i
¬(A→ B)
..... pi
′
⊥
raa3
B
.... pi
= Π ′
(19c)
∃ introduction:
Π =
p¬A{t/x}q1
..... pi
′
⊥
raa1
A{t/x}
∃i
∃xA
.... pi
 
p¬∃xAq2
pA{t/x}q1
∃i
∃xA
¬e
⊥
¬1i
¬A{t/x}
..... pi
′
⊥
raa2
∃xA
.... pi
= Π ′ (20)
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∃ elimination:
Π =
p¬∃xAq1
..... pi
′
⊥
raa1
∃xA
pAq2
..... pi
′′
C
∃2e
C
.... pi
 
p∃xAq2
p¬Cq3
pAq1
..... pi
′′
C
¬e
⊥
∃1e
⊥
¬2i
¬∃xA
..... pi
′
⊥
raa3
C
.... pi
= Π ′
(21a)
where the last rule of the derivation pi′′ is not an instance of the rule raa
(notice that the variable x does not occur free in C and hence even in
¬C, thus the rule ∃e is correctly instantiated in Π
′);
Π =
..... pi
′
∃xA
p¬Cq1, pAq2
..... pi
′′
⊥
raa1
C
∃2e
C
.... pi
 
..... pi
′
∃xA
p¬Cq2, pAq1
..... pi
′′
⊥
∃1e
⊥
raa2
C
.... pi
= Π ′
(21b)
where the last rule of the derivation pi′ is not an instance of the rule raa
(notice that the variable x does not occur free in C and hence even in
¬C, thus the rule ∃e is correctly instantiated in Π
′);
Π =
p¬∃xAq1
..... pi
′
⊥
raa1
∃xA
p¬Cq2, pAq3
..... pi
′′
⊥
raa2
C
∃3e
C
.... pi
 
p∃xAq2
p¬Cq3, pAq1
..... pi
′′
⊥
∃1e
⊥
¬2i
¬∃xA
..... pi
′
⊥
raa3
C
.... pi
= Π ′
(21c)
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(notice that the variable x does not occur free in C and hence even in
¬C, thus the rule ∃e is correctly instantiated in Π
′);
∀ elimination:
Π =
p¬∀xAq1
..... pi
′
⊥
raa1
∀xA
∀e
A{t/x}
.... pi
 
p¬A{t/x}q2
p∀xAq1
∀e
A{t/x}
¬e
⊥
¬1i
¬∀xA
..... pi
′
⊥
raa2
A{t/x}
.... pi
= Π ′ (22)
efq and raa:
Π =
p¬⊥q1
..... pi
′
⊥
raa1
⊥
efq
B
.... pi
 
p⊥q1
¬1i
¬⊥
..... pi
′
⊥
efq
B
.... pi
= Π ′ (23a)
Π =
p¬Bq2, p¬⊥q1
..... pi
′
⊥
raa1
⊥
raa2
B
.... pi
 
p¬Bq2,
p⊥q1
¬1i
¬⊥
..... pi
′
⊥
raa2
B
.... pi
= Π ′ (23b)
Notation. For all derivations Π and Π ′ in NK, we write Π  Π ′ if Π ′ is
obtained from Π by applying one of the reduction steps listed above. The
reflexive-transitive closure of  is denoted by  ∗.
Given Π  Π ′, we say that each instance of raa in Π that is explicitly
represented in the left-hand side of any reduction step listed above—with the
exception of the reduction step (23b)— is active. Concerning the reduction
step (23b) (i.e. the raa case), if r1 and r2 are the two instances of raa in Π that
are explicitly represented in the left-hand side of the reduction step, and if r1
(resp. r2) is the instance whose conclusion is ⊥ (resp. B), then only r1 is active.
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IfΠ  Π ′ and r1, . . . , rn are the active instances of raa inΠ, we will write
Π
r1,...,rn
 Π ′. According to the reduction rules listed above, n ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
It is easy to check that, for each reduction step listed above, there is
at least one active instance of the rule raa in Π. These reduction steps
might involve some non-local modifications over derivations. For example,
when Π  Π ′, a subderivation of Π might be erased or duplicated in Π ′,
depending on the number of assumptions that are discharged by the active
instances of raa in Π  Π ′. Moreover, some subderivations of Π can be
moved in Π ′ above some other subderivations of Π (this corresponds to an
operation of proof composition).
When Π  Π ′, there is no reduction step which introduces in Π ′ a new
discharging instance of raa: any discharging instance of raa in Π ′ can thus
be seen as a “residual” of an instance of raa in Π (possibly non-discharging
or applied to another formula). However, it is not true that any instance of
raa in Π has a residual in Π ′; for example in the reduction steps (13c), (23a)
or (23b) the active instance of raa in Π vanishes in Π ′.
Remark 3. The case where Π  Π ′ by applying the reduction step (18)
(i.e. the →i case) is the only one introducing in Π
′ a new instance of efq:
the instance of efq in Π ′ explicitly represented in the right-hand side of the
reduction step (18) is not a residual of any instance of efq in Π. In a way, it
is impossible to avoid adding an instance of efq in the→i case: this is deeply
related to the fact that (A → ¬¬B) → ¬¬(A → B) is provable in NJ but
not in NM. Indeed, if it were possible to define the following reduction step
(where in the subderivations pi and pi′ there is no instance of raa, and the
formulas occurring in the non-discharged assumptions of Π ′ are a subset the
formulas occurring the non-discharged assumptions of Π)
Π =
pAq2, p¬Bq1
.... pi
⊥
raa1
B
→2i
A→ B
 
p¬(A→ B)q2
pAq1
..... pi
′
B
→1i
A→ B
¬e
⊥
raa2
A→ B
= Π ′
then, by replacing the instances of raa in Π and Π ′ by instances of ¬i, the
conclusions of Π and Π ′ would be A→ ¬¬B and ¬¬(A→ B), respectively:
this would mean that the derivability of A → ¬¬B in NM would imply the
derivability of ¬¬(A→ B) in NM, which is impossible.
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Remark 4. It is easy to check that if Π is a derivation in NK and Π  Π ′,
then Π ′ is a derivation in NK and Π is not a derivation in NM (Π contains
at least one instance of raa, discharging or not discharging). In the reduction
steps listed above, the ∀i case (where in Π an instance of the rule ∀i is
immediately below the instance of raa under focus) is absent, otherwise Π ′
could not be a derivation in NK, as we have pointed out in §2.2. In other
words, if Π
r
 Π ′ then r is not an instance of raa in Π whose conclusion is
the premise of an instance of ∀i.
Remark 5. The reduction steps (13c), (14c) and (19c) possess a certain
degree of arbitrariness since they could also be defined so that, in Π ′, the
subderivation pi′ would be put above pi′′, and not vice-versa.
Observe the similarities between the reduction steps in the ∧i and →e
cases, or in the ∧e, ∨i and ∀e cases, or in the ∨e and ∃e cases. In contrast,
the reduction steps for the ¬i and→i cases (resp. ¬e and→e cases) are rather
different: the former – (12) (resp. (13)) – erases an instance of raa, whereas
the latter – (18) (resp. (19)) – postpones an instance of raa after an instance
of→i (resp.→e), moreover in the→i case the reduction step introduces a new
instance of efq, unlike the ¬i case. This differing behavior justifies our choice
to consider ¬ as primitive and not to treat ¬A as a shorthand for A→ ⊥.
5. Postponement of raa
In this section we prove the first main result of this paper: the postponement
of raa (Theorem 8, Corollary 9), i.e. the fact that it is possible to transform
a derivation in NK in such a way that any possible instance of raa is pushed
downward until it vanishes or it occurs only in the last rule, preserving the
same conclusion and without adding any new non-discharged assumptions.
More precisely, we show that, by repeated applications of the reduction steps
of §4 following a suitable strategy:
• a derivation pi in NK without the rule ∀i reduces all its instances of raa
to at most one instance of raa occurring as the last rule, the rest of the
derivation being in NJ (Theorem 8.1);
• a derivation pi in NK without the rules ∀i and→i reduces all its instances
of raa to at most one instance of raa occurring as the last rule, the rest
of the derivation being in NM (Theorem 8.2).
This result will be then reformulated by focusing on the form of the conclusion
and of the non-discharged assumptions of pi, rather than on the kind of
inference rules used in pi (Corollary 9).
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Two lemmas are used in the proof of Theorem 8. The first one (Lemma 6)
says that when the reduction steps of §4 are applied, no new non-discharged
assumptions are added in the reduced derivation, and the conclusion of the
original derivation is preserved. Moreover, the reduction steps neither intro-
duce nor erase any instance of the rules→i and ∀i. The second one (Lemma 7)
says that the sizeRAA (resp. size
+
RAA) of a derivation strictly decreases when
one applies a reduction rule whose active instance of raa is a RAA-maximal
(resp. RAA+-maximal) instance.
Lemma 6 (Preservations). Let Π and Π ′ be derivations in NK with Π  Π ′.
1. If Π : Γ ⊢ A, then Π ′ : Γ ⊢ A;
2. If Π has no instance of the rule →i (resp. ∀i), then Π
′ has no instance
of the rule →i (resp. ∀i).
Proof. By straightforward inspection of the reduction steps listed in §4.
The converse of Lemma 6.1 does not hold, as shown by the following
counterexample (taking Γ = {¬P,P} and A = Q ∧ R, where P , Q and R
are distinct proposition symbols):
Π =
¬P P
¬e
⊥
efq
Q R
∧i
Q ∧R
 
¬P P
¬e
⊥
efq
Q ∧R
= Π ′ (24)
Hence, in (24) we have Π ′ : Γ ⊢ A but we do not have Π : Γ ⊢ A, since
the set of non-discharged assumptions of Π also contains (an occurrence of)
the formula R (see point (iii) about notations at p. 23). In other words,
Lemma 6.1 says that if Π  Π ′ then the formulas occurring among the non-
discharged assumptions of Π ′ are a subset of the formulas occurring among
the non-discharged assumptions of Π.
Derivability in NJ is not preserved by the reduction steps of §4: the fact
that Π is a derivation in NJ and Π  Π ′ does not always imply that Π ′ is a
derivation in NJ, because an instance of the rule efq in Π can be transformed
into a discharging instance of the rule raa in Π ′. Consider, for example, the
following situation:
Π =
¬P ∨Q
p¬Pq1 P
¬e
⊥
efq
Q pQq1
∨1e
Q
 
¬P ∨Q
p¬Pq1 P
¬e
⊥
p¬Qq2 pQq1
¬e
⊥
∨1e
⊥
raa2
Q
= Π ′.
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Lemma 7 (Size decreasing). Let Π and Π ′ be derivations in NK such that
Π
r1,...,rn
 Π ′ where n ∈ N+.
1. If ri is RAAΠ-maximal (resp. RAA
+
Π-maximal) for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then
rj is RAAΠ-maximal (resp. RAA
+
Π -maximal) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
2. If Π contains no instance of the rule ∀i, and if rj is RAA
+
Π-maximal for
some 1 ≤ j ≤ n, then sizeRAA+(Π
′) < sizeRAA+(Π).
3. If Π contains no instance of the rules →i and ∀i, and if rj is RAAΠ-
maximal for some 1 ≤ j ≤ n, then sizeRAA(Π
′) < sizeRAA(Π).
Proof. By straightforward inspection of all the reduction steps listed in
§4. The hypothesis of maximality for the active instances of raa is crucial:
it ensures that when a subderivation is moved above another subderivation
according to the reduction step, no instance of raa is moved away from the
conclusion of the derivation.
Note that, in the proof of Lemma 7, the complexity of the formulas occur-
ring in the conclusions of the instances of raa play no role (see Definition 1):
the fact that the sizes sizeRAA and sizeRAA+ decrease applying the reduction
steps listed in §4 is purely “geometrical”, due to the decrease of the distance
of a maximal raa from the conclusion of the derivation.
Lemma 7.3 becomes false if Π contains an instance of the rule →i, as
shown by the following counterexample (see also Remark 3):
Π =
pPq2 p¬Pq1
¬e
⊥
raa1
P
→2i
P → P
 
p¬(P → P )q3
pPq2
p¬(P → P )q3
pPq1
→0i
P → P
¬e
⊥
¬1i
¬P
¬e
⊥
efq
P
→2i
P → P
¬e
⊥
raa3
P → P
= Π ′
where sizeRAA(Π) = 1 < 3 = sizeRAA(Π
′), since the instance of efq in Π ′
belongs to RAAΠ′ .
Theorem 8 (Postponement of raa, version 1). Let Π : Γ ⊢ A be a derivation
in NKr {∀i}.
1. One has Π  ∗ Π ′ for some j-standard derivation Π ′ : Γ ⊢ A in NKr{∀i}.
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2. If Π contains no instance of the rule →i, then there exists some m-
standard derivation Π ′ : Γ ⊢ A in NKr {→i,∀i} such that Π  
∗ Π ′.
Proof.
1. By induction on sizeRAA+(Π) ∈ N.
If sizeRAA+(Π) = 0, then just take Π
′ = Π, according to Remark 2.1.
Otherwise, sizeRAA+(Π) > 0 and there exists r ∈ RAA
+
Π which is RAA
+
Π -
maximal and which is not the last rule of Π. Since there is no instance
of the rule ∀i in Π, there necessarily exists a Π
′ such that Π
r1,...,rn
 Π ′
where n ∈ N+ and r = rj for some 1 ≤ j ≤ n. According to Lemma 7.1,
all r1, . . . , rn are RAA
+
Π -maximal. By Lemma 6.1, Π
′ : Γ ⊢ A, and, by
Lemma 6.2, Π ′ has no instance of the rule ∀i. According to Lemma 7.2,
sizeRAA+(Π
′) < sizeRAA+(Π). Hence, by the induction hypothesis, there
is a j-standard derivation Π ′′ : Γ ⊢ A in NKr{∀i} such that Π  Π
′
 
∗
Π ′′.
2. By induction on sizeRAA(Π) ∈ N.
If sizeRAA(Π) = 0, then just take Π
′ = Π, according to Remark 2.2.
Otherwise, sizeRAA(Π) > 0 and there exists r ∈ RAAΠ which is RAAΠ -
maximal and which is not the last rule of Π. Since there is no instance
of the rule ∀i in Π, there necessarily exists a Π
′ such that Π
r1,...,rn
 Π ′,
where n ∈ N+ and r = rj for some 1 ≤ j ≤ n. According to Lemma 7.1,
all r1, . . . , rn are RAAΠ -maximal. By Lemma 6.1, Π
′ : Γ ⊢ A, and, by
Lemma 6.2, Π ′ has no instance of the rules ∀i and →i. According to
Lemma 7.3, sizeRAA(Π
′) < sizeRAA(Π). Hence, by the induction hypoth-
esis, there is a m-standard derivation Π ′′ : Γ ⊢ A in NK r {→i,∀i} such
that Π  Π ′  ∗ Π ′′.
Theorem 8 can be see as a weak standardization theorem: for every deriva-
tion Π in NK (fulfilling suitable conditions), we have shown that there exists
a particular strategy for the application of the reduction steps of §4 (we fire
only maximal instances of raa) transforming Π into a “standard” derivation
in NK, where “standard” is here understood in the sense of Definition 1. We
conjecture that Theorem 8 can be strengthened to a strong standardization
theorem: whatever strategy in the application of the reduction steps of §4
terminates in a “standard” derivation in NK. To prove that, one should refine
the notion of size of a derivation and proceed by a more complex induction.
Thanks to the normalization theorem and the suitable subformula prop-
erty for NK proved by Stålmarck in [22, pp. 130, 135],20 we can reformulate
20See also [31, p. 208].
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Theorem 8.1 (resp. Theorem 8.2) with a more satisfactory hypothesis: in-
stead of supposing that the derivation Π : Γ ⊢ A in NK is without any
instance of the rule ∀i (resp. rules ∀i and →i), it is sufficient to suppose that
A and the formulas in Γ do not contain any occurrence of ∀ (resp. ∀ and→).
Note that, since in Stålmark’s normalization strategy for classical logic raa is
pushed downward only with respect to elimination rules, a proof in classical
normal form in his sense can still contain instances of raa that can reduced
via the reduction steps proposed in §4. In this sense the following corollary
of Theorem 8 is not completely trivial.
Corollary 9 (Postponement of raa, version 2). Suppose Γ ⊢NK A.
1. If A and the formulas in Γ do not contain any occurrence of ∀, then there
exists a j-standard derivation Π ′ : Γ ⊢ A in NK.
2. If A and the formulas in Γ do not contain any occurrence of ∀ nor →,
then there exists a m-standard derivation Π ′ : Γ ⊢ A in NK.
Proof. First, we recall some facts that will be used to prove Corollaries 9.1-
2. As Γ ⊢ A is derivable in NK, there exists a normal (in the sense of
[22, p. 130]) derivation Π : Γ ⊢ A in NK and hence, in conformity to the
aforementioned subformula principle for NK (see [22, p. 130]), each formula
occurrence B in Π satisfies one of the clauses (i)-(iii) below:
(i) B is an occurrence of a subformula of A or of some formula in Γ ;
(ii) B is an assumption discharged by some instance of the rule raa, B has
the form ¬C, and C is a subformula of A or of some formula in Γ ;
(iii) B has the form ⊥ and stands immediately below an assumption which
satisfies (ii) above.
We can now prove Corollaries 9.1-2.
1. According to the subformula principle, there are no instances of the rule ∀i
in Π. By Theorem 8.1, there is a j-standard derivation Π ′ : Γ ⊢ A in NK.
2. According to the subformula principle, there are no instances of the rule
→i or the rule ∀i in Π. By Theorem 8.2, there is a m-standard derivation
Π ′ : Γ ⊢ A in NK.
Thus, according to Corollary 9.1 (resp. Corollary 9.2), when we look for
a derivation of A from Γ , where A and all formulas in Γ do not contain any
occurrence of ∀ (resp. ∀ nor →), we can consider the use of a discharging
(resp. either discharging or undischarging) instance of raa only at the end of
the derivation, if this use is required.
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In what follows we give two examples of the postponement of raa, accord-
ing Theorems 8.1 and 8.2.
Example 10. Given two proposition symbols P and Q, let Π : ⊢ (¬¬P →
P ) ∧ (¬¬Q → Q) be the following derivation in NK (note that there are no
instances of ∀i in Π):
Π =
p¬¬Pq2 p¬Pq1
¬e
⊥
raa1
P
→2i
¬¬P → P
p¬¬Qq4 p¬Qq3
¬e
⊥
raa3
Q
→4i
¬¬Q→ Q
∧i
(¬¬P → P ) ∧ (¬¬Q→ Q)
For every proposition symbol Z, let pi(Z) : ¬(¬¬Z → Z) ⊢ ⊥ be the following
derivation in NJ:
pi(Z) =
¬(¬¬Z → Z)
p¬¬Zq2
¬(¬¬Z → Z)
pZq1
→0i
¬¬Z → Z
¬e
⊥
¬1i
¬Z
¬e
⊥
efq
Z
→2i
¬¬Z → Z
¬e
⊥
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By applying the procedure defined in the proof of Theorem 8.1, we get:
Π  
p¬(¬¬P → P )q1
.....
pi(P )
⊥
raa1
¬¬P → P
p¬¬Qq3 p¬Qq2
¬e
⊥
raa2
Q
→3i¬¬Q→ Q
∧i
(¬¬P → P ) ∧ (¬¬Q→ Q)
 
p¬(¬¬P → P )q1
.....
pi(P )
⊥
raa1
¬¬P → P
p¬(¬¬Q→ Q)q2
.....
pi(Q)
⊥
raa2
¬¬Q→ Q
∧i
(¬¬P → P ) ∧ (¬¬Q→ Q)
 
p¬((¬¬P → P ) ∧ (¬¬Q→ Q))q3
p¬¬P → Pq2 p¬¬Q→ Qq1
∧i
(¬¬P → P ) ∧ (¬¬Q→ Q)
¬e
⊥
¬1i
¬(¬¬Q→ Q)
.....
pi(Q)
⊥
¬2i
¬(¬¬P → P )
.....
pi(P )
⊥
raa3
(¬¬P → P ) ∧ (¬¬Q→ Q)
.
Example 11. Given two proposition symbols P and Q, let Π : P ⊢ P ∨ Q
be the following derivation in NK (note that there are no instances of →i or
∀i):
Π = p¬Pq1
p¬Pq1 P
¬e
⊥
efq
P ∧Q
∧e1
P
¬e
⊥
raa1
P
∨i1
P ∨Q
By applying the procedure defined in the proof of Theorem 8.2, we get:
Π  
p¬Pq1
p¬Pq1 P
¬e
⊥
efq
P
¬e
⊥
raa1
P
∨i1
P ∨Q
 
p¬Pq1 P
¬e
⊥
raa1
P
∨i1
P ∨Q
 
p¬(P ∨Q)q2
pPq1
∨i1
P ∨Q
¬e
⊥
¬1i
¬P P
¬e
⊥
raa2
P ∨Q
.
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6. Generalized Glivenko’s theorem
As already mentioned in §1-2, an immediate consequence of the postpone-
ment of raa is the weak normalization of NK r {∀i}. Indeed, a normaliza-
tion strategy is the following: by Theorem 8.1, any derivation pi : Γ ⊢ A
in NK r {∀i} reduces to a j-standard derivation pi
′ : Γ ⊢ A in NK r {∀i}
(which is a derivation in NJ, possibly except for its last rule which could be
a discharging instance of raa), then one can apply Prawitz’s original weak
normalization theorem for NJ [17, p. 50] to pi′ (or to pi′ without its last rule),
so as to obtain a normal derivation pi′′ : Γ ⊢ A in NKr {∀i}.
Another consequence of the postponement of raa (Theorem 8, Corollary 9)
is a strengthened form of Glivenko’s theorem embedding full first-order clas-
sical logic not only into the fragment {⊥,⊤,¬,∧,∨,→,∃} of intuitionistic
logic (Theorem 16), but also into the fragment {⊥,⊤,¬,∧,∨,∃} of minimal
logic (Theorem 15). The idea is that, given a derivation Π in NK whose last
rule is an instance of raa, the rest of Π is a subderivation in NJ or NM; the
instance of raa can thus be replaced by an instance of ¬i.
We define a translation (·)m (resp. (·)j) on formulas that just redefines
the implication and the universal quantifier (resp. only the universal quanti-
fier) in a classical way, using the negation, the disjunction and the existential
quantifier (resp. the negation and the existential quantifier). All other con-
nectives and the existential quantifier are left alone.
Definition 12 (Minimal and intuitionistic translations). The minimal trans-
lation is a function (·)m associating with every formula A a formula Am
defined by induction on A as follows:
(P (t1, . . . , tn))
m = P (t1, . . . , tn) ⊤
m = ⊤ ⊥m = ⊥
(A ∧B)m = Am ∧Bm (A ∨B)m = Am ∨Bm (¬A)m = ¬Am
(A→ B)m = ¬Am ∨Bm (∀xA)m = ¬∃x¬Am (∃xA)m = ∃xAm
The intuitionistic translation is a function (·)j associating with every for-
mula A a formula Aj defined by induction on A as follows:
(P (t1, . . . , tn))
j = P (t1, . . . , tn) ⊤
j = ⊤ ⊥j = ⊥
(A ∧B)j = Aj ∧Bj (A ∨B)j = Aj ∨Bj (¬A)j = ¬Aj
(A→ B)j = Aj → Bj (∀xA)j = ¬∃x¬Aj (∃xA)j = ∃xAj.
Given a set of formulas Γ , we set Γm = {Am | A ∈ Γ} and Γ j = {Aj | A ∈
Γ}.
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The difference between (·)m and (·)j is only in the translation of A→ B.
Our minimal and intuitionistic translations are deeply related to Kuroda’s
negative translation. More precisely, if (·)m
′
and (·)j
′
are the translations
defined as in Definition 12, except for
(∀xA)m
′
= ∀x¬¬Am
′
(∀xA)j
′
= ∀x¬¬Aj
′
,
then the negative translation A 7→ ¬¬Aj
′
is the one defined by Kuroda in
[12], while the negative translation A 7→ ¬¬Am
′
is a variant of Kuroda’s one
introduced in [8, p. 231].
Using the terminology of [8], (·)m and (·)j are modular translations in the
sense that the translation of a formula is based on the translation of its imme-
diate subformulas. The names “minimal” and “intuitionistic” associated with
(·)m and (·)j, respectively, are due to the derivability relation they preserve:
this will be clarified in Theorems 15.2-16.2 and Propositions 18.1-2 below,
which imply that
⊢NK A iff ⊢NJ ¬¬A
j iff ⊢NM ¬¬A
m.
A consequence of this fact, together with Remark 13.1 below, is that the
translation A 7→ ¬¬Am (resp. A 7→ ¬¬Aj) is modular negative according
to [8]. Besides, the modular negative translations A 7→ ¬¬Am and A 7→
¬¬Am
′
(resp. A 7→ ¬¬Aj and A 7→ ¬¬Aj
′
) are the same according to [8,
Definition 2], in the sense that they are interderivable with respect to minimal
logic.21 However, quite interestingly, they have a very different behavior with
respect to the postponement of raa: only the negative translation A 7→ ¬¬Am
(resp. A 7→ ¬¬Aj ) allows one to use Theorem 8.2 (resp. Theorem 8.1), since
in Am
′
(resp. Aj
′
) the universal quantifier might occur, with the disturbing
effect pointed out in §2.2 and Remark 4. A variant of our minimal translation
is discussed in Appendix A.3.
Remark 13. For every formula A, by induction on A we can prove that:
1. ⊢NK A if and only if ⊢NK A
m if and only if ⊢NK A
j;
2. Am contains no occurrences of → and ∀; Aj contains no occurrences of ∀;
3. the free variables in Am and Aj are the same as in A, and (A{t/x})m =
Am{t/x} and (A{t/x})j = Aj{t/x} for any term t;
4. Am = A if A contains no occurrences of → and ∀; Aj = A if A contains
no occurrences of ∀.
21Note, in particular, that ¬∃x¬A is provably equivalent to ∀x¬¬A in minimal logic.
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Actually, one direction of the equivalences in Remark 13.1 can be refor-
mulated in a more informative and constructive way from a proof-theoretic
viewpoint, thanks to (the proof of) the following lemma.
Lemma 14 (Preservation of derivability in NK w.r.t. translations). For every
derivation Π : Γ ⊢ A in NK there exist a derivation Π ′ : Γm ⊢ Am in NKr{→i
,∀i} and a derivation Π
′′ : Γ j ⊢ Aj in NKr {∀i}.
Proof. By induction on the derivation Π in NK. Let us consider its last rule
r. Due to Definition 12, to prove the existence of a derivation Π ′ : Γm ⊢ Am
in NK r {→i,∀i} the only interesting cases are when r is an instance of →i
or →e or ∀i or ∀e.
If r is an instance of →i, then Π : Γ ⊢ A → B and there is a derivation
pi : Γ,A ⊢ B in NK such that
Π =
pAq1
.... pi
B
→1i
A→ B
.
By the induction hypothesis, there is a derivation pi′ : Γm, Am ⊢ Bm in
NKr {→i,∀i}. Let
Π ′ =
p¬(¬Am ∨Am)q2
p¬(¬Am ∨ Am)q2
pAmq1
∨i1
¬Am ∨ Am
¬e
⊥
¬1i
¬Am
∨i2
¬Am ∨ Am
¬e
⊥
raa2
¬Am ∨ Am
p¬Amq3
∨i1
¬Am ∨Bm
pAmq3
..... pi
′
Bm
∨i2
¬Am ∨Bm
∨3e
¬Am ∨Bm
.
So, Π ′ : Γm ⊢ ¬Am∨Bm is a derivation in NKr{→i,∀i}, where ¬A
m∨Bm =
(A→ B)m.
If r is an instance of →e, then Π : Γ ⊢ B and there are derivations
pi1 : Γ1 ⊢ A→ B and pi2 : Γ2 ⊢ A in NK such that Γ = Γ1 ∪ Γ2 and
Π =
....
pi1
A→ B
....
pi2
A
→e
B
.
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By the induction hypothesis, there are derivations pi′1 : Γ
m
1 ⊢ ¬A
m ∨Bm and
pi′2 : Γ
m
2 ⊢ A
m in NKr {→i,∀i}. Let
Π ′ =
.....
pi′1
¬Am ∨Bm
p¬Amq1
.....
pi′2
Am
¬e
⊥
efq
Bm pBmq1
∨1e
Bm
.
Thus, Π ′ : Γm ⊢ Bm is a derivation in NKr {→i,∀i}.
If r is an instance of ∀i, then Π : Γ ⊢ ∀xA and there is a derivation
pi : Γ ⊢ A in NK such that the variable x is not free in any formula of Γ and
Π =
.... pi
A
∀i
∀xA
.
By the induction hypothesis, there is a derivation pi′ : Γm ⊢ Am in NKr {→i
,∀i}. By Remark 13.3, the variable x is not free in any formula of Γ
m. Let
Π ′ =
p∃x¬Amq2
p¬Amq1
..... pi
′
Am
¬e
⊥
∃1e
⊥
¬2i
¬∃x¬Am
.
Thus, Π ′ : Γm ⊢ ¬∃x¬Am is a derivation in NKr {→i,∀i}, where (∀xA)
m =
¬∃x¬Am.
If r is an instance of ∀e, then Π : Γ ⊢ A{t/x} and there is a derivation
pi : Γ ⊢ ∀xA in NK such that
Π =
.... pi
∀xA
∀e
A{t/x}
.
By the induction hypothesis, there is a derivation pi′ : Γm ⊢ ¬∃x¬Am in
NKr {→i,∀i}. Let
Π ′ =
..... pi
′
¬∃x¬Am
p¬Am{t/x}q1
∃i
∃x¬Am
¬e
⊥
raa1
Am{t/x}
.
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Thus, Π ′ : Γm ⊢ Am{t/x} is a derivation in NKr{→i,∀i}, where (A{t/x})
m =
Am{t/x} by Remark 13.3.
The proof of the existence of a derivation Π ′′ : Γ j ⊢ Aj in NK r {∀i}
is analogous to the proof of the existence of a derivation Π ′ : Γm ⊢ Am in
NKr {→i,∀i}, but the only interesting cases are when r is an instance of ∀i
or ∀e.
In general, derivability in NM is not preserved via the translation (·)m:
e.g. ⊢NM P → P but 6⊢NM ¬P ∨ P , where (P → P )
m = ¬P ∨ P . Also, a
formula A in general is not derivably equivalent to Aj in NJ (resp. Am in
NM), since ∀xA is not equivalent to ¬∃x¬A in intuitionistic (resp. minimal)
logic.
Theorem 15 (Generalized Glivenko’s theorem, minimal version).
1. If Γ ⊢NK A, then Γ
m ⊢D ¬¬A
m and Γm,¬Am ⊢D ⊥, where D = NMr{→i
,→e,∀i,∀e}.
2. If→ and ∀ occur neither in A nor in any formula of Γ , then the following
are equivalent:
(a) Γ ⊢NK A, (b) Γ ⊢NM ¬¬A, (c) Γ,¬A ⊢NM ⊥.
If moreover A = ¬B, then: Γ ⊢NK ¬B if and only if Γ ⊢NM ¬B.
Proof.
1. Since Γ ⊢ A is derivable in NK, according to Lemma 14, there exists a
derivation Π : Γm ⊢ Am in NK r {→i,∀i}, and by Theorem 8.2, there
exists a derivation Π ′ : Γm ⊢ Am in NK r {→i,∀i} with at most one
instance of the rule raa: this instance, if any, is the last rule of Π ′, the
rest of Π ′ being a derivation in NM. Only two cases are possible:
• either the last rule of Π ′ is not an instance of raa, and thus Π ′ is a
derivation in NM, so that Π ′′ : Γm ⊢ ¬¬Am and Π ′′′ : Γm,¬Am ⊢ ⊥
are derivations in NM, where:
Π ′′ =
..... Π
′
Am p¬Amq1
¬e
⊥
¬1i¬¬Am
and Π ′′′ =
..... Π
′
Am ¬Am
¬e
⊥
;
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• or the last rule of Π ′ is an instance of raa, i.e.
Π ′ =
p¬Amq1
.... pi
⊥
raa1
Am
where pi : Γm,¬Am ⊢ ⊥ is a derivation in NM. So, Π ′′ : Γm ⊢ ¬¬Am is
a derivation in NM where Π ′′ is obtained from Π ′ by replacing the in-
stance of raa with an instance of ¬i discharging the same assumptions,
i.e.
Π ′′ =
p¬Amq1
.... pi
⊥
¬1i
¬¬Am
.
We have thus proved that Γm ⊢ ¬¬Am and Γm,¬Am ⊢ ⊥ are derivable
in NM. According to Remark 13.2, neither Am nor any formula in Γm
contain occurrences of → and ∀; hence, according to the normalization
theorem and the subformula property for NM [17, p. 53], Γm ⊢ ¬¬Am
and Γm,¬Am ⊢ ⊥ are derivable in NMr {→i,→e,∀i,∀e}.
2. (a) implies (b): By Theorem 15.1, since Γ ⊢ A is derivable in NK, there
is a derivation Π : Γm ⊢ ¬¬Am in NM. According to Remark 13.4,
Γm = Γ and Am = A. So, Π : Γ ⊢ ¬¬A (in NM).
(b) implies (c): If Π : Γ ⊢ ¬¬A is a derivation in NM, then Π ′ : Γ,¬A ⊢
⊥ is a derivation in NM, where
Π ′ =
.... Π
¬¬A ¬A
¬e
⊥
.
(c) implies (a): Since NM ⊆ NK, if Π : Γ,¬A ⊢ ⊥ is a derivation in NM,
then Π is a derivation in NK. Therefore, Π ′ : Γ ⊢ A is a derivation
in NK, where
Π ′ =
p¬Aq1
.... Π
⊥
raa1
A
.
This proves the equivalences: (a) iff (b) iff (c).
Suppose now that moreover A = ¬B. We show that Γ ⊢NK ¬B if and
only if Γ ⊢NM ¬B.
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if: Every derivation pi : Γ ⊢NM ¬B is also a derivation in NK because
NM ⊆ NK.
only if: Since Γ ⊢NK ¬B, there exists pi : Γ ⊢NM ¬¬¬B according to the
implication (a)⇒(b) we have just proved. Therefore, pi′ : Γ ⊢NM ¬B
where
pi′ =
.... pi
¬¬¬B
p¬¬¬Bq3
p¬Bq1 pBq2
¬e
⊥
¬1i
¬¬B
¬e
⊥
¬2i
¬B
→3i
¬¬¬B → ¬B
→e
¬B
.
Theorem 16 (Generalized Glivenko’s theorem, intuitionistic version).
1. If Γ ⊢NK A, then Γ
j ⊢D ¬¬A
j and Γ j,¬Aj ⊢D ⊥ where D = NJr {∀i,∀e}.
2. If ∀ occurs neither in A nor in any formula of Γ , then the following are
equivalent:
(a) Γ ⊢NK A, (b) Γ ⊢NJ ¬¬A, (c) Γ,¬A ⊢NJ ⊥.
If moreover A = ¬B, then: Γ ⊢NK ¬B if and only if Γ ⊢NJ ¬B.
Proof. The proof of each part of Theorem 16 is analogous to the proof of
the respective part of Theorem 15 below, replacing (·)m with (·)j, NM with
NJ, NMr {→i,∀i} with NJr {∀i}, NMr {→i,→e,∀i,∀e} with NJr {∀i,∀e}.
To prove Theorem 16.1 we use Theorem 8.1 instead of Theorem 8.2, and the
normalization theorem and the subformula property for NJ instead of the
normalization theorem and the subformula property for NM (see [17, p. 53]).
To prove Theorem 16.2 we use Theorem 16.1 instead of Theorem 15.1.
An immediate consequence of Theorem 16.2 (resp. Theorem 15.2) is the
next corollary: in the fragment {⊥,⊤,¬,∨,∧,→,∃} (resp. {⊥,⊤,¬,∨,∧,∃})
of first-order logic, the consistency of a set of formulas in classical logic is
equivalent to its consistency in intuitionistic (resp. minimal) logic.
Corollary 17 (Relative consistency of a theory). Let a theory be a set of
formulas Γ .
1. If ∀ does not occur in any formula of Γ , then: Γ ⊢NK ⊥ if and only if
Γ ⊢NJ ⊥.
50 Guerrieri and Naibo
2. If → and ∀ do not occur in any formula of Γ , then: Γ ⊢NK ⊥ if and only
if Γ ⊢NM ⊥.
Proof. The proof of Corollary 17.1 is analogous to the proof of Corol-
lary 17.2: it is sufficient to replace NM with NJ, and use Theorem 16.2
instead of Theorem 15.2. We now prove Corollary 17.2.
only if: Since Γ ⊢ ⊥ is a derivable in NK, then by Theorem 15.2 there is
a derivation pi : Γ,¬⊥ ⊢ ⊥ in NM. So, Π : Γ ⊢ ⊥ is a derivation in NM
where
Π =
p⊥q1
¬1i
¬⊥
.... pi
⊥
.
if: Since NM ⊆ NK, every derivation pi : Γ ⊢ ⊥ in NM is also in NK.
The fact that Theorem 15.2 and Corollary 17.2 (resp. Theorem 16.2 and
Corollary 17.1) are restricted to the fragment {⊥,⊤,¬,∧,∨,∃} (resp. {⊥,⊤,¬,
∧,∨,→,∃}) of the first-order language of classical logic is not a limit because
this fragment is equally expressive as full first-order classical logic (with re-
spect to the derivability relation).
For the sake of completeness, (a slightly strengthened version of) the
converses of Theorems 15.1 and 16.1 also hold (the proof is straightforward
and left to the reader):
Proposition 18. Let A be a formula and Γ be a set of formulas.
1. If Γm ⊢NM ¬¬A
m (or equivalently Γm,¬Am ⊢NM ⊥), then Γ ⊢NK A.
2. If Γ j ⊢NJ ¬¬A
j (or equivalently Γ j,¬Aj ⊢NJ ⊥), then Γ ⊢NK A.
7. Conclusion
The literature concerning the connections between classical and constructive
logic is extremely rich and prolific. Our aim in this paper was to give a
sort of unifying view of some of these results, by adopting a proof-theoretic
perspective, and, in particular, by focusing on a very specific technique: that
of postponing the application of the rule of reduction ad absurdum in the
proofs of classical logic.
After having sketched the evolution of this technique starting from the
seminal work of Prawitz in his monograph on natural deduction [17], we
have focused our attention on a particular strategy of postponement: the
one adopted by Seldin [20]. The interest of this strategy is that it can be
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characterized in a sort of geometrical way. In this sense, we proposed a
modified version of it by reasoning only on the distance from the conclusion
of the instances of raa present in a certain derivation, and we left aside any
consideration on the syntactic structure of the formulas introduced by the
instances of raa. This insensitivity to syntactic considerations makes the
technique extensible to logic systems going beyond first-order classical logic,
like modal classical logic and, especially, second-order classical logic.22 We
also conjecture that, even if our postponing strategy is a weak one, it is
possible to transform it into a strong one, in the sense that the order of
application of our reduction steps is not essential: any order of application
should allow one to push raa downward with respect to all the other rules.
The other aspect on which we focused our attention is the possibility of
extracting some constructive content from the postponing strategy that we
presented. In particular, we have been able to obtain Glivenko’s theorem in
a uniform form, that is, working both for intuitionistic and minimal logic. As
for the postponement of raa, it should not be difficult to extend it to systems
that go beyond first-order logic, such as modal logic and second-order logic.
Finally, since the proof of Glivenko’s theorem rests on the use of a neg-
ative translation, and since negative translation is closely related to the
continuation-passing style (CPS) transformations in functional programming,
it would be interesting to investigate which is the proper computational in-
terpretation (in terms of λ-calculus) that can be assigned to the negative
translation induced by our postponing strategy. In particular, since our
translation of classical logic into intuitionistic logic is just a variant of the
Kuroda translation, it is reasonable to expect that our translation simulates
a call-by-value evaluation strategy in a call-by-name interpreter (see [8, p.
255], [13, p. 158 ff.]). And since we can define also a translation of classical
logic into minimal logic, it would be interesting to understand whether this
second translation generates a different CPS transformation or not.
References
[1] Andou, Y., ‘A normalization-procedure for the first order classical natural deduction
with full logical constants’, Tsukuba Journal of Mathematics, 19 (1995), 153–162.
[2] Ariola, Z. M., H. Herbelin, and A. Sabry, ‘A proof-theoretic foundation of
abortive continuations’, Higher-Order and Symbolic Computation, 20 (2007), 4, 403–
429.
[3] Brown, C. E., and C. Rizkallah, ‘Glivenko and Kuroda for Simple Type Theory’,
The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 79 (2014), 2, 485–495.
22Clearly, in second order classical logic, the postponement of raa does not also imply
the normalization theorem.
52 Guerrieri and Naibo
[4] de Groote, P., ‘Strong normalization of classical natural deduction with disjunc-
tion’, in S. Abramsky, (ed.), Typed Lambda Calculi and Applications. 5th Interna-
tional Conference, TLCA 2001, Proceedings, vol. 2044 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, Springer, 2001, pp. 182–196.
[5] Ertola, R., and M. Sagastume, ‘Subminimal logic and weak algebras’, Reports on
Mathematical Logic, 44 (2009), 153–166.
[6] Espíndola, C., ‘A short proof of Glivenko theorems for intermediate predicate logics’,
Archive for Mathematical Logic, 52 (2013), 7, 823–826.
[7] Farahani, H., and H. Ono, ‘Glivenko theorems and negative translations in sub-
structural predicate logics’, Archive for Mathematical Logic, 51 (2012), 7, 695–707.
[8] Ferreira, G., and P. Oliva, ‘On the relation between various negative translations’,
in U. Berger, H. Diener, P. Schuster, and M. Seisenberger, (eds.), Logic, Construction,
Computation, vol. 3 of Ontos-Verlag Mathematical Logic Series, De Gruyter, 2012, pp.
227–258.
[9] Galatos, N., and H. Ono, ‘Glivenko theorems for substructural logics over FL’,
Journal of Symbolic Logic, 71 (2006), 1353–1384.
[10] Glivenko, V., ‘Sur quelques points de la logique de M. Brouwer’, Bulletins de la
Classe des Sciences, 15 (1929), 5, 183–188.
[11] Kleene, S. C., Introduction to metamathematics, North-Holland, 1952.
[12] Kuroda, S., ‘Intuitionistische untersuchungen der formalistischen logik’, Nagoya
Mathematical Journal, 2 (1951), 35–47.
[13] Murthy, C., Extracting Constructive Content From Classical Proofs, Ph.D. thesis,
Cornell University, 1990.
[14] Ono, H., ‘Glivenko theorems revisited’, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 161 (2009),
2, 246–250.
[15] Pereira, L. C., ‘Translations and normalization procedures (ab-
stract)’, in WoLLIC’2000 – 7th Workshop on Logic, Language,
Information and Computation, 2000, pp. 21–24. Available at
www.cin.ufpe.br/~wollic/wollic2000/proceedings/anais.ps.gz.
[16] Pereira, L. C., and E. H. Haeusler, ‘On constructive fragments of classical logic’,
in Heinrich Wansing, (ed.), Dag Prawitz on Proofs and Meaning, vol. 7 of Outstanding
Contributions to Logic, Springer, Berlin, 2015, pp. 281–292.
[17] Prawitz, D., Natural Deduction: A proof-theoretical study, Almqvist & Wiksell,
Stockholm, 1965.
[18] Prawitz, D., ‘Ideas and results in proof theory’, in Jens Erik Fenstad, (ed.), Proceed-
ings of the Second Scandinavian Logic Symposium, Studies in Logic and Foundations
of Mathematics, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1971, pp. 237–309.
[19] Schroeder-Heister, P., and G. K. Olkhovikov, ‘On flattening elimination rules’,
The Review of Symbolic Logic, 7 (2014), 1, 60–72.
[20] Seldin, J. P., ‘On the proof theory of the intermediate logic MH’, The Journal of
Symbolic Logic, 51 (1986), 3, 626–647.
[21] Seldin, J. P., ‘Normalization and excluded middle. I’, Studia Logica, 48 (1989), 2,
193–217.
[22] Stålmarck, G., ‘Normalization theorems for full first order classical natural deduc-
tion’, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 56 (1991), 1, 129–149.
Postponement of raa and Glivenko’s theorem, revisited (extended version) 53
[23] Statman, R., Structural Complexity of Proofs, Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University,
1974.
[24] Tennant, N., Anti-Realism and Logic: Truth as eternal, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 1987.
[25] Troelstra, A. S., and H. Schwichtenberg, Basic Proof Theory, 2nd edn., no. 43
in Cambridge Tracts in Theoretical Computer Science, Cambridge University Press,
2000.
[26] von Plato, J., ‘Natural deduction with general elimination rules’, Archive for Math-
ematical Logic, 40 (2001), 7, 541–567.
[27] von Plato, J., Elements of Logical Reasoning, Cambridge University Press, 2013.
[28] von Plato, J., ‘Explicit composition and its application in proofs of normalization’,
in Thomas Piecha, and Peter Schroeder-Heister, (eds.), Advances in Proof-Theoretic
Semantics, vol. 43 of Trends in Logic, Springer, 2016, pp. 139–152.
[29] von Plato, J., and S. Negri, Structural Proof Theory, Cambridge University Press,
2001.
[30] von Plato, J., and S. Negri, Proof Analysis: A contribution to Hilbert’s last prob-
lem, Cambridge University Press, 2011.
[31] von Plato, J., and A. Siders, ‘Normal derivability in classical natural deduction’,
The Review of Symbolic Logic, 5 (2012), 205–211.
[32] Zdanowski, K., ‘On second order intuitionistic propositional logic without a univer-
sal quantifier’, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 74 (2009), 1, 157–167.
54 Guerrieri and Naibo
A. Appendix
A.1. Hidden negative translations
In Stålmarck’s reduction for ∨ classical detours – see (9) – the application of
raa used for introducing the formula A∨B disappears, and it is not replaced
by any application of raa on (one of) the subformulas A and B, as it happens,
instead, in the case of conjunction. It is thus not possible, in the reduced
derivation of (9), to operate the substitution of raa with a ¬i in order to
obtain ¬A or ¬B. It seems, then, that the procedure used for obtaining
a negative translation from the normalization of classical logic cannot be
applied in the case of disjunction. However, in this reduced derivation, the
∨e is used in a restricted way, namely with C = ⊥, i.e.
A ∨B
pAq1
..... pi
′
⊥
pBq1
..... pi
′′
⊥
∨1e
⊥
Now, from the two subderivations pi′ and pi′′ it is possible to obtain the
formula ¬A ∧ ¬B:
pAq1
..... pi
′
⊥
¬1i
¬A
pBq2
..... pi
′′
⊥
¬2i
¬B
∧i
¬A ∧ ¬B
And since A ∨ B and ¬A ∧ ¬B are contradictory in minimal logic, one can
infer ¬(¬A ∧ ¬B). This means that, in the process of normalization, A ∨B
behaves like ¬(¬A∧¬B). There is thus no substantial difference to Prawitz’s
treatment of disjunction, which is defined from the beginning by means of
negation and conjunction (see p. 8, supra).
It is worth noting that this is not a peculiarity of the ∨e rule. It can be
claimed that all general elimination rules hide a sort of negative translation.
According to Schroeder-Heister and Olkhovikov [19], it is possible to flatten
the general elimination rules used by von Plato and Siders (see p. 13, supra)
by translating them into formulas of second-order propositional logic. In
particular, the ∧e rule becomes the formula ∀X(((A ∧ B) → X) → X), the
∨e rule becomes ∀X(((A→ X)∧ (B → X)) → X), and the→e rule becomes
∀X((A ∧ (B → X)) → X). Then, by instantiating X with ⊥, the ∧e rule
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gets associated with ¬¬(A ∧B), the ∨e rule with ¬(¬A ∧ ¬B), and the →e
rule with ¬(A ∧ ¬B). Disjunction and implication are then treated like in
the Gödel-Gentzen’s translation.
A.2. Tennant’s proof of the Glivenko’s theorem
In [24, pp. 266–274], Tennant gives a proof of Glivenko’s theorem for minimal
and intuitionistic logic by using a double-negation translation that allows him
to transform classical rules into derivable rules of minimal and intuitionistic
logic.
What he proves is the following theorem:
Theorem 19. Let Γ be a set of formulas, and (·)∗ be a function that,
when applied to Γ , adds two negations (¬¬) in front of any formula of
Γ .
1. Every derivation Π : Γ ⊢ A in Dc can be converted into a derivation Π
′ :
(Γ )∗ ⊢ (A)∗ in Dm, where Dc = NKr {→i,∀i} and Dm = NMr {→i,∀i}.
2. Every derivation Π : Γ ⊢ A in Dc can be converted into a derivation
Π ′ : (Γ )∗ ⊢ (A)∗ in Di, where Dc = NKr {∀i} and Dm = NJr {∀i}.
In order to better explain how Tennant’s idea works, it is easiest to con-
sider a natural deduction setting presented in a sequent calculus style. Con-
sider then a rule of Dc of the form
Γ1 ⊢ A1 . . . Γn ⊢ An
s
Γ ⊢ A
What is first shown by Tennant is that the rule
(Γ1)
∗ ⊢ (A1)
∗ . . . (Γn)
∗ ⊢ (An)
∗
s∗
(Γ )∗ ⊢ (A)∗
(25)
is derivable either in Dm or in Di.
Consider, for example, the rule
Γ ⊢ A ∆ ⊢ B
∧i
Γ,∆ ⊢ A ∧B
In order to show that the rule
(Γ )∗ ⊢ (A)∗ (∆)∗ ⊢ (B)∗
∧∗i
(Γ )∗, (∆)∗ ⊢ (A ∧B)∗
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is derivable in Dm or Di, it is sufficient to consider the following derivation
(Γ )∗ ⊢ ¬¬A
(∆)∗ ⊢ ¬¬B
ax
¬(A ∧B) ⊢ ¬(A ∧B)
ax
A ⊢ A
ax
B ⊢ B
∧i
A,B ⊢ A ∧B
¬e
¬(A ∧B), A,B ⊢ ⊥
¬i
¬(A ∧B), A ⊢ ¬B
¬e
¬(A ∧B), A, (∆)∗ ⊢ ⊥
¬i
¬(A ∧B), (∆)∗ ⊢ ¬A
¬e
¬(A ∧B), (Γ )∗, (∆)∗ ⊢ ⊥
¬i
(Γ )∗, (∆)∗ ⊢ ¬¬(A ∧B)
The situation is a little bit more complicated when one has to deal with
rules involving a discharge of hypothesis. The problem is that if A is one of
the hypotheses to be discharged, then it is not sufficient to translate it into
(A)∗, i.e. ¬¬A. Otherwise, trying to discharge ¬¬A will perturb the structure
of the derivation, and one will be unable to get the desired conclusion. It
then becomes necessary to compose with a proof of A ⊢ ¬¬A in order to
carry out the right discharge on A.
Consider, for example, the case of the implication introduction rule:
A,Γ ⊢ B
→i
Γ ⊢ A→ B
In order to show that the rule
(A)∗, (Γ )∗ ⊢ (B)∗
→∗i
(Γ )∗ ⊢ (A→ B)∗
is derivable, one has to consider the following derivation
ax
¬(A→ B) ⊢ ¬(A→ B)
ax
¬A ⊢ ¬A
ax
A ⊢ A
¬e
¬A,A ⊢ ⊥
¬i
A ⊢ ¬¬A ¬¬A, (Γ )∗ ⊢ ¬¬B
comp
A, (Γ )∗ ⊢ ¬¬B
ax
¬(A→ B) ⊢ ¬(A→ B)
ax
B ⊢ B
→i
B ⊢ A→ B
¬e
B,¬(A→ B) ⊢ ⊥
¬i
¬(A→ B) ⊢ ¬B
¬e
A,¬(A→ B), (Γ )∗ ⊢ ⊥
efq
A,¬(A→ B), (Γ )∗ ⊢ B
→i
¬(A→ B), (Γ )∗ ⊢ A→ B
¬e
¬(A→ B), (Γ )∗ ⊢ ⊥
¬i
(Γ )∗ ⊢ ¬¬(A→ B)
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where comp is a rule for explicit composition (of derivations), like the one
used in [28].
Note that the step of efq cannot be avoided. It is for this reason that the
→i rule has to be dropped in order to obtain Glivenko’s theorem for minimal
logic (cf. Remark 3).
The rule of ¬i is treated similarly to→i. However, Tennant works modulo
the minimal equivalences ¬¬¬A↔ ¬A and ¬¬⊥ ↔ ⊥; he can thus simplify
the form taken by the conclusion of the translated rule, obtaining
¬¬A, (Γ )∗ ⊢ ⊥
¬∗i
(Γ )∗ ⊢ ¬A
Moreover, the translation of the raa rule can be simply obtained as a
special case of the previous rule, namely by taking A = ¬B, i.e.
¬¬¬B, (Γ )∗ ⊢ ⊥
raa∗
(Γ )∗ ⊢ ¬¬B
Once the rules of classical logic have been translated into derivable rules
of minimal or of intuitionistic logic of the form we just described, it is easy to
show that each derivation Π : Γ ⊢ A in classical logic can be translated into
a derivation Π ′ : (Γ )∗ ⊢ (A)∗ in minimal or intuitionistic logic, by a step-by-
step translation of each rule of Π. More precisely, the proof of Theorem 19
is given by induction on the length of the proof Π : Γ ⊢ A ([24, p. 273]).
The base step is that of the axiom rule, which is trivial. The inductive step
depends on the last rule s applied in Π. The inductive hypothesis guarantees,
for each subderivation Πi of Π, a derivation Π
′
i of the desired form. Then,
in order to obtain Π ′, it is sufficient to apply the translation of the rule s to
these derivations Π ′i.
In some particular situations, Π could already contain a subderivation Πi
of the same conclusion ¬¬A (i.e. (A)∗) of the desired derivation Π ′, but from
a set of assumptions which is only a subset of (Γ )∗. The two derivations Π ′i
and Π ′ are thus the same, modulo some applications of the weakening rule.
One could then simply take the subderivation Π ′i, instead of reconstruct-
ing Π ′ step-by-step from Π. It is for this reason that Tennant formulates
Theorem 19 by considering a derivation Π ′ of (Γ ′)∗ ⊢ (A)∗, where Γ ′ ⊆ Γ .23
Note that if in the case of minimal logic we restrict to the fragment
{¬,∧,∨,⊥,∃}, and in the case of intuitionistic logic to the fragment {¬,∧,∨,
23Note also that Tennant proves Glivenko’s theorem for the relevant versions of minimal
and intuitionistic logic. However, we will not discuss this point here, since our article
simply focuses on standard logical systems, and not on relevant ones.
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→,⊥,∃}, then the translation function (·)∗ is nothing but the Kuroda trans-
lation (see §6). More precisely, in the case of minimal logic we have that
(A)∗ = ¬¬(A)m, while in the case of intuitionistic logic (A)∗ = ¬¬(A)j. In
particular, when the translations (·)m and (·)j are applied to the two afore-
mentioned fragments, they behave like the identity function, keeping the
formulas on which they are applied invariant (see Definition 12). Thus, in
order to obtain a result analogue to Theorems 15.2 and 16.2., it would be
sufficient to apply Theorem 19 to a certain derivation Π : Γ ⊢ A, obtain then
a derivation Π ′ : (Γ )∗ ⊢ (A)∗, and finally compose it with the derivation
Ax
¬C ⊢ ¬C
Ax
C ⊢ C
¬e
¬C,C ⊢ ⊥
¬i
C ⊢ ¬¬C
(26)
for every formula ¬¬C present in (Γ )∗. In this way a new derivation Π ′′ :
Γ ⊢ (A)∗ is obtained (see [24, p. 274]).24
Tennant remarks that if we do not want to drop the universal quantifier –
both in the case of minimal and intuitionistic logic – then we have to proceed
in the following way: for the ∀e rule, one can simply translate it according
to the the schema (25), while for the ∀i rule, one has to proceed inductively
(see [24, p. 247]). Consider a derivation Π : Γ ⊢ ∀xA in NK, ending with ∀i.
By the induction hypothesis, we can apply Theorem 19 to the subderivation
Π1 : Γ ⊢ A and obtain the derivation Π
′
1 : (Γ )
∗ ⊢ (A)∗. Apply then the
∀i rule, and finally add a double negation using (26). In other words, the
derivation
Π =
.....
Π1
Γ ⊢ A
∀i
Γ ⊢ ∀xA
of NK is transformed into the derivation
Π ′ =
¬∀x(A)∗ ⊢ ¬∀x(A)∗
......
Π ′1
(Γ )∗ ⊢ (A)∗
∀i
(Γ )∗ ⊢ ∀x(A)∗
¬e
(Γ )∗,¬∀x(A)∗ ⊢ ⊥
¬i
(Γ )∗ ⊢ ¬¬∀x(A)∗
24Note that this is very similar to the procedure we already discussed in order to deal
with the translation of rules that discharge hypothesis (see p. 56, supra).
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of either NMr {→i,→e} or NJ.
This seems to suggest that universal formulas can be translated in the fol-
lowing way: (∀xA)∗ = ¬¬∀x(A)∗, which corresponds to the original Kuroda
translation, since ¬¬∀x(A)∗ corresponds either to ¬¬∀x(A)m
′
or to ¬¬∀x(A)j
′
(for the definition of (·)m
′
and (·)j
′
see p. 44).
However, this is not the case. The reason is that, by following Tennant’s
idea, the way in which universal formulas are translated is not a uniform one,
but it depends on their position inside a derivation. In particular, it depends
on whether they are in the position of hypothesis or are the conclusion of a ∀i.
In the first case, only a double negation is put in front of them, while in the
second case a double negation is also put in front of the quantified formula.
This means that when the universal quantifier is added to the language, the
translation set up by Tennant is no longer functional at the level of formulas.
This same situation would occur if one tried to adapt Tennant’s treatment
of the universal quantifier in order to deal with implication in minimal logic:
it would be possible to prevent the loss of implication, but the price to pay
would be to have a translation from NK to NM which is not functional at the
level of formulas.
A.3. An alternative reduction strategy
As we already noticed (see Remark 3), the reduction steps that we defined
in §4 make essential use of intuitionistic logic only in the →i case—where
the efq rule is explicitly introduced for defining the reduction step (18) at
p. 31—while in all the other cases the appeal to minimal logic is already
sufficient for defining the subderivations preceding the application of the raa
rule. It is for this reason that in order to prove Glivenko’s theorem for
minimal logic, we had to give up implication, and define a translation (·)m
such that (A→ B)m = ¬Am ∨Bm.
We show here that, in fact, implication could be preserved, but the price
to pay is the imposition of important restrictions on the form of the conse-
quent of an implication, so that a certain uniformity and generality of the
translation is lost.
Consider the following reduction:
60 Guerrieri and Naibo
Π =
pAq2, p¬Bq1
..... pi
′
⊥
raa1
B
→2i
A→ B
.... pi
 
p¬(A→ B)q3
pAq2,
p¬(A→ B)q3
pBq1
→0i
A→ B
¬e
⊥
¬1i
¬B
..... pi
′
⊥
¬0i
¬¬B
(28)
B
→2i
A→ B
¬e
⊥
raa3
A→ B
.... pi
= Π ′ (27)
The rule (28) is a derivable rule, obtained by appealing to the following
theorem of minimal logic:
⊢NM B ↔ ¬¬B (28)
where B is a negative formula, i.e. atomic formulas occur only negated in B,
and B does not contain ∨ nor ∃ (see [25, p. 48]).
According to this new reduction, before applying the raa rule, only infer-
ential steps coming from minimal logic are used. However, such a reduction
can be applied only when the consequent of the implication is a negative
formula. The consequence is that, even if we can extract a translation from
classical to minimal logic from this new reduction, this translation will be
neither uniform nor general like the one given in Definition 12.
More precisely, when we restrict to the propositional case, the translation
induced by replacing the reduction rule (18) at p. 31 with this new one
corresponds to a translation (·)m
∗
which behaves like (·)m, except for the
implication, which is defined as follows:
(A→ B)m
∗
= Am
∗
→ ¬¬Bm
∗
(where B is a negative formula)
The same considerations can be made in the case of the ∀i rule. In
particular, we could use the following reduction:
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Π =
p¬Aq1
..... pi
′
⊥
raa1
A
∀i
∀xA
.... pi
 
p¬Aq1
..... pi
′
⊥
¬1i
¬¬A
(28)
A
∀i
∀xA
.... pi
= Π ′ (29)
and then define (·)m
∗
for the universal quantifier as follows:
(∀xA)m
∗
= ∀x(A)m
∗
(where A is a negative formula)
This new translation (·)m
∗
is the same as the one defined in [8, p. 249],25
except for the restriction about negative formulas. The need of this restric-
tion seems to be explained by the fact the our translation is directly defined
from classical to minimal logic (at the level of proof reduction), while in [8,
§6] it is obtained by making an intermediary step through intuitionistic logic
(at the level of formulas): first, classical logic is embedded into intuitionistic
logic via the Kolmogorov translation; secondly, the translated formulas ob-
tained in this way are embedded into minimal logic via a set of simplification
rules definable in minimal logic itself that reduce the number of negations
present in a formula. In particular, passing through the Kolmogorov transla-
tion allows one to put negations in front of atomic formulas and to eliminate
the occurrences of ∨ or ∃ by using equivalences provable in minimal logic,
like ¬(¬¬A ∨ ¬¬B) ↔ ¬A ∧ ¬B or ¬∃x¬¬A ↔ ∀x¬A. In this way, the
condition on (28) is always respected, and thus no restrictions have to be
explicitly imposed.
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